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Introduction
This dissertation is about the understanding of markets, defined as a large number
of individuals taking decentralized decisions. The tool I use to model markets is
game theory: when individuals take decisions that do not depend only on exogenous
parameters, but also on the decisions the others take. More specifically, in the games
I study here, decisions depend on beliefs: what people decide depends on what they
expect other people to do. And the same population, with different beliefs, can take
different decisions. Game theorists denote this by “multiple equilibria”. Hence, a
first common feature of the three chapters of this dissertation is that they involve
problems of coordination among a large number (in fact, a continuum) of players.
A second common feature comes from the concept of horizontal differentiation. I
am interested in studying worlds were what distinguishes individuals and products
are not their intrinsic quality, but a matter of taste
The first chapter, “On goods and premises” relates to one of the most long lasting
questions in economics: how efficient is a decentralized market to match buyers and
sellers - to exhaust the potential gains from trade - and how the surplus of this trade is
shared among them. In a world of perfect information, the typical answer is known
as the “Bertrand Paradox”: firms compete in prices, and always have an incentive to
set a lower price than their competitors, until the price is so low that firms make zero
profit. Hence, no one searches, all the gains from trade are exhausted, and the entire
surplus goes to consumers. In a world of positive search costs, the picture is entirely
reversed, and known as the “Diamond Paradox”: as long as buyers have a positive
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cost to search for another seller, it is a best response for every individual seller to
slightly increase the price above the market one. As all sellers have the same best
response, the market price increases until it is exactly the monopoly price. Hence,
no one searches and the sellers receive the same surplus as a monopolist. Those
two polar cases do not correspond to what is observed in reality: there is price
dispersion – homogeneous goods are sold at different prices, even on the Internet
where search costs are almost zero – and search on actual markets. To explain this,
several models have introduced heterogeneity of information among consumers,
vertical differentiation of products, and more complex game structure.
What I do is coming back to the very simple specification of the two aforemen-
tioned paradoxes. I model homogeneous goods and services sold on premises, e.g.
in a shop or on a website. Since premises differ across sellers, even homogeneous
goods become somehow differentiated through the purchasing experience. Differ-
entiation affects all the goods sold on given premises, and it is costly for buyers to
get used to a different shop. I study the impact of such differentiation on the equilib-
rium level of horizontal diversity (between premises) and of prices in an otherwise
competitive market. Sellers choose between two categories of premises. There are
two types of buyers with different tastes on premises. I show that the market out-
come never exhausts all the gains from trade. The market failure is independent
of search costs, even when they become arbitrarily small. When buyers care suffi-
ciently about the premises, the market may appear efficient: there is search, product
diversity, price dispersion and all buyers accept an offer. However it is not efficient,
since only the buyers of the minority type search until they find a good match, while
majority types accept any offer. It is important to note that, if the market ineffi-
ciency I characterize comes from a problem of coordination, it is not a coordination
failure. Indeed, when I consider only Coalition-Proof Nash-Equilibrium – to avoid
inefficiencies that could be overcome by allowing communication among coalitions
of sellers – the market still fails to exhaust the gains from trade. The sellers coor-
dinate towards the equilibrium that yields the highest profit for them, but this profit
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is still lower than what a monopoly would get. Forcing the market to produce the
category desired by the majority always increases aggregate consumer welfare. It
also increases total welfare when the market does not supply enough of the category
desired by the majority. In any case, a monopolist owning all the premises would
increase total welfare by extracting the entire surplus. Hence, competition increases
buyer surplus at the cost of creating inefficiencies in the matching process.
The second chapter, “On the economic impact of smoking bans in bars and
restaurants” adds another layer to this model to allow for what is a common fea-
ture of many of the leisure consumption goods: people do not buy alone. Hence,
I assume that individuals buy in groups, potentially with mixed preferences, and
that utility within the group is non-transferable: it is not possible to transfer utility
from a member of the group to another. This specification allows explaining what
has been, and still is in some countries, a largely debated policy issues: smoking
bans. Preference for a smoking or nonsmoking environment is a matter of taste,
that can yield to externalities within given groups. The policy debate is about de-
ciding whether it is a good idea to impose a norm corresponding to the taste of the
majority to limit those externalities. Four stylized facts stand out in the empirical
literature on smoking bans in bars and restaurants: (i) bans do not hurt business
for restaurants; (ii) before a law is voted, the market equilibrium typically fails to
offer non-smoking environments; (iii) the impact on bars is more contrasted, most
likely a decrease in employment after the ban; (iv) the support for smoking bans
typically increases after a smoking ban is enforced. The literature does not ex-
plain those results. Assuming an economy with a majority of nonsmokers, I model
a market with arbitrarily small search costs where buyers differ in taste and con-
sume in groups. I show that in a decentralized equilibrium, unless all restaurants
and bars ban smoking, nonsmoking premises are patronized only by nonsmokers
while smokers, mixed groups and even some groups of nonsmokers attend smoking
premises. In the presence of smoking premises, there are two sources of inefficiency
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that go on the opposite directions. Too many smoking premises imply a large share
of the nonsmokers being mismatched. Too many nonsmoking premises imply a
large share of mixed groups leaving the market without buying. I derive a necessary
and sufficient condition for smoking bans to be welfare improving. If this condition
is not met, the welfare-maximizing policy is to sell a very small share of licenses
to allow smoking. A general smoking ban (weakly) decreases the profit of owners.
However, substitution effects can lead to measurement errors: if the ban applies
to restaurants only, the impact on the profit of restaurants is ambiguous, while the
profit of bar decreases and the number of smoking bars increases.
The third chapter, co-authored with Quentin David, is about coordination prob-
lems in the discrete choice of modal transportation within a city: “Private car or
public transportation”. Urban transportation is characterized by two types of exter-
nalities. First, in the short run, cars generate congestion: this is also a cross-modal
externality, as congestion also affects public transportation. Second, in the medium
and long run, public transportation exhibits positive network externalities: the high-
est the share of public transportation users, the highest the frequency of public trans-
portation for a given cost – or, similarly, the lowest the per capita price of a given
investment. Transportation economics mostly focuses on the first effect, and the
idea that the taxation of congestion can be welfare improving is consensual among
economists. However, considering commuters with heterogeneous preferences for
a car can allow for multiple equilibria when one considers the second externality.
If a large share of commuters does not have strong preferences in favor of the car
or public transportation, the following can happen: if they believe most commuters
take the car, then it is a best response to take the car as public transportation is in-
efficient. But, if they believe most commuters take public transportation, it may be
a better option to choose for public transportation. Hence, a social planner focus-
ing on the marginal impact of policies may miss the largest source of inefficiency.
We discuss two policy tools: taxation and traffic separation (e.g. exclusive lanes
Introduction 5
for public transportation). Taxation helps reaching a local maximum by internal-
izing marginal externalities. Traffic separation decreases cross-modal externalities
and therefore marginally increases the relative efficiency of public transportation. If
this policy allows commuters to coordinate towards a better equilibrium, it can help
reaching a global maximum in total welfare.
Part I
Essays in product diversity
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Chapter 1
On Goods and Premises
Price dispersion, homogenous goods sold at different prices in different shops,
is a well documented fact, both online and offline (Baye, Morgan and Scholten
(2004), Sorensen (2000)). Typical explanations rely on hidden quality of shops
(Clemons, Hann and Hitt (2002)), sequential search with either noise (Burdett
and Judd (1983)), heterogeneous information (Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian
(1980)), or bounded rationality (Baye and Morgan (2004)). In this paper, I study
how price dispersion can be an equilibrium, even with homogenous production costs
(among sellers) and information about the prices (among buyers). I show that when
a decentralized market displays product diversity in equilibrium, it is inefficient to
match sellers with the tastes of buyers.
Most goods, even if perfectly homogeneous, are sold in what I here denote un-
der the general term of ‘premises’. When you buy a particular brand of shoes, you
buy it in a shop. The utility you derive from your purchase also depends on the shop
itself. Search costs within a shop are negligible. Information about the distribution
of prices and the existing categories of premises is common knowledge. However,
changing for another shop with different rules, procedures, or organization has a
cost.1 One needs to get used to the shop, its prices and check whether it sells the
1Even when you buy on the Internet, the website - its graphical organization and presentation -
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8brand of shoes you want. While trying to remain as close as possible to the pure
competition case, I consider search costs that are arbitrarily small2 and model prod-
uct diversity as follows. Sellers choose to sell a good or service on premises of
either category A or B, at no cost. There are buyers of type a and type b in the mar-
ket, in a proportion that is common knowledge, with a strict majority of type a. A
buyer awards a higher valuation to a good match (A&a or B&b) than to a mismatch
(A&b or B&a). Buyers are price takers but have the option of not buying, and of
searching for other premises selling a different category or at a lower price.
In the absence of search costs, all buyers would be correctly matched and firms
would make zero profit. However, any strictly positive search cost makes the market
inefficient: some buyers are not correctly matched. I find that when search costs
are arbitrarily small and buyers care sufficiently about the premises, the typical3
equilibrium involves price dispersion, diversity of the premises and full extraction
of the surplus of the majority type a by the sellers. The buyers of the minority type b
keep searching until they find a good match. As long as search costs are not exactly
zero, the inefficiency remains and is independent of the size of these costs. The
mechanism behind this equilibrium is the following: (i) sellers of either category set
a price that corresponds to the participation constraint of type a buyers. Therefore
category A sellers do not meet the participation constraint of type b buyers, (ii)
sellers of category B leave some surplus to buyers of type b. As a consequence (iii)
buyers of type a accept any offer as they get exactly their reservation utility from
both categories of firms, (iv) buyers of type b keep searching until they find a seller
of category B, where they receive some surplus, (v) the profit of firms of category
affects your experience. If you are already signed in, you can buy more easily - and feel more secure
- than if you have to register to a new one.
2The idea of the existence of a potential tradeoff between the taste for diversity of buyers and the
minimization of transaction costs has been recently studied by Woodruff (2002).
3The equilibrium concept used here is Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium, as defined by Bern-
heim, Peleg and Whinston (1987). Others Nash Equilibria exist, but are not robust to self-enforcing
deviations of a mass of sellers. Using this concept allows characterizing a market failure that is not
caused by a coordination failure.
9B is decreasing in their number (since they share the buyers of type b that search)
while the profit of category A firms is independent of their number (since there is no
search component in their demand). Hence in equilibrium (vi) the share of category
B firms is such that their profit is exactly equal to that of category A firms.
As search costs are almost inexistent, this seems to be efficient: there is product
diversity, search and price dispersion. However it is not: a share of buyers of type
a is not correctly matched. Forcing the market to produce the category desired by
the majority always increases aggregate consumer welfare by decreasing average
price and increasing the share of good match. It also increases total welfare when
the market does not supply enough of category A. In any case, a monopolist own-
ing all the premises would increase total welfare by providing both categories at a
price that gives incentive to the buyers to search. With search costs going to zero,
this allows extracting almost the entire surplus of buyers. Hence, competition in-
creases buyer surplus at the cost of creating inefficiencies in the matching process.
This model applies to a variety of monopolistically competitive markets: clothing,
theaters, bars, restaurants, bookstores, retail stores, shoe stores. . . Even to service
providers as solicitors, physicians, etc. as long as there is a choice to be made by
sellers and that it is not possible for a seller to satisfy all types of buyers. Here are
two very simple examples.
Example 1 The market for hair salons. Each hairdresser can provide a large
choice of haircuts, colors, at various prices. But when she must decide whether
to opt for a ‘first come, first served’ policy or accept appointments, the two deci-
sions are mutually exclusive (at least for a given time slot). By choosing a system of
appointments, the hairdresser satisfies a share of the customers (those who prefer to
plan ahead), but disappoints the other share that prefers to come in unexpectedly.
The production costs are roughly the same but it is impossible to please both types
of customers at the same time of the day.
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Example 2 A TV screen in a bar. Bars can serve a variety of drinks, but when
they have to decide whether or not to install a TV, it affects all consumers in the
room. The barman can offer you any drink you want, your drinking experience is
always influenced - positively or negatively, depending on your type - by the televi-
sion. Consider that a majority of buyers prefer to go to bars that have a television,
and that this preference is sufficiently important. The model predicts that bars with
television will be more expensive, and that most buyers will therefore be indifferent
between bars that have a television and those that do not, while the buyers who do
not like having a TV in a bar will only go to places that cater specifically to their
taste.
Product diversity is a well-documented topic. The idea that the characteristics of
goods can be valued differently by different types of individuals has been formal-
ized by Lancaster (1966). The novelty of my results comes from a combination
of 3 elements. First, the level of horizontal diversity is endogenously determined
by the sellers, as opposed to random utility models (Perloff and Salop (1985), De-
neckere and Rotschild (1992), Anderson and Renault (1999)). This implies that
a continuum of firms may produce homogenous goods in equilibrium if it is a best
response for them. Second, search costs are independent of the localization of the
sellers, as opposed to models à la Hotelling (Salop (1979), Stahl (1982), Dudey
(1990),Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986)). That is, in my model, sellers do not be-
come more accessible to some buyers by changing their good category (position in
a Hotelling/Salop model). Third, I model a market, as opposed to the many models
using a representative agent (as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)). Hence, the ineffi-
ciency is not related to the cost structure, but to the failure of the market mechanism
itself.
Price dispersion with homogenous goods has been studied in several papers,
mostly in the context of the Internet. See Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2005) for
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a survey. The price structure in horizontal matching models has been studied by
Besley and Ghatak (2005), Clark (2007) and Klumpp (2009), but all assume
diversity to be exogenously given. Endogenous diversity in oligopoly is studied
among others by Chen and Riordan (2006), Kuksov (2004) and Bar-Isaac, Caru-
ana and Cunat (2008). The market failure in my model comes from the presence of
nontransferabilities in the matching process (buyers are price takers and there is no
bargaining). Legros and Newman (2007) study how non-transferable utility affects
matching when differentiation is vertical. As in Nocke, Peitz and Stahl (2007), I
find that a monopoly can extract more gains from trade then a competitive owner-
ship.
The result that firms can extract consumer surplus in my model is close to Di-
amond (1971). In the classical formulation of price competition, firms set a price
equal to the marginal cost in equilibrium. Introducing search costs in the specifica-
tion yields the so-called ‘Diamond Paradox’: a model of search with a large number
of buyers and a large number of sellers does not converge to a competitive equilib-
rium à la Bertrand. In finite time, the price becomes the one that maximizes joint
profit. The logic behind Diamond (1971) is the following. Consider that a time
period is the time it takes for a buyer to visit a store. At the beginning of each pe-
riod, the seller sets the price for the whole period. The only way for a consumer to
learn the price set by a specific store is to enter it. The commodity is bought once.
Consumers know the distribution of prices today, and are aware that the price might
change tomorrow. There is no product differentiation. Search costs take a very gen-
eral form. The utility of a buyer is given by U(p,z)with p the price and z the number
of periods needed to buy. The condition is that U is decreasing in both arguments.
For a given price level in the market, sellers always have an incentive to slightly
increase their price until they reach the monopoly level. Indeed, by charging a little
more than their competitors, sellers make sure that a buyer who enters their shop
will not keep searching for a lower price elsewhere.
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In this paper, since there is no capacity constraint for the sellers, and as buy-
ers buy either zero or exactly one unit, a Diamond Paradox would be an efficient
outcome (with the entire surplus extracted by the sellers). However, product differ-
entiation changes the picture and, in equilibrium, profit maximizing sellers are not
maximizing joint profit. Hence, while the price mechanism is closely related to the
one of Diamond (1971), my results do not imply a similar paradox. Once horizon-
tal differentiation is feasible, there is search and price dispersion in equilibrium, but
another inefficiency arises, due to the mismatching of a share of buyers.
I present the setup of the model in the next section. Section 2 characterizes
the equilibrium result: I first show that none of the Nash Equilibria are efficient.
Even if search costs are arbitrarily small, not all buyers are properly matched. Two
cases may arise:4 when buyers do not care sufficiently about the premises, only one
category is produced and when buyers do care sufficiently about the premises, there
is product diversity and search in the only Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium. In
Section 3, I discuss the policy implications of these results. I extend the results to a
continuum of types and larger search costs in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Setup
The economy is composed of two groups, each of them being a continuum of mass
1. The first group is the buyers, with an exogenous fraction α of type a and 1−α of
type b. In this presentation of the model, I consider α ∈ (12 ,1).5 The second group
is composed of sellers, who endogenously choose a category A or B. The choice
of category is costless: price dispersion does not come from switching costs. A
‘good’ match (a&A or b&B) generates surplus V and a ‘bad’ match (a&B or b&A)
4I characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for both cases.
5The results for α ∈ (0, 12 ) are symmetric. I exclude the non-generic possibility of having exactly
α = 12 . Heterogeneous buyers implies α < 1.
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generates surplus v < V .6 The surplus is received by the buyer if she accepts the
price set by the seller. The outside option is set to r ∈ (0,v).7 Both categories are
produced with no fixed cost and marginal cost normalized to 0. A buyer can buy
either 0 or exactly 1 unit of either good. Parameters α,V,v,r and discount factor δ
are common knowledge The stages of the game are as follows:
1. Sellers simultaneously choose a category of premises (either A or B) and price
offer ;
2. Buyers learn the share γ of sellers of category A, and the distribution of prices
;
3. Each buyer is randomly matched with a seller.8 She observes the price and the
chosen category of the seller she is matched with. Each buyer decides whether
to Accept the offer, Leave the market and receive the outside option r or to
Search for another seller. If a buyer searches, she is randomly matched with
another seller, but her payoffs are discounted with a parameter δ < 1. There
is no limit for search, but the cumulated discount factor decreases to δ s after
s searches.9
1.2 Equilibria
In this Section, I assume arbitrarily small search costs (δ → 1).10 I first show that
there are only two potential prices in equilibrium and that the market outcome
6The fact that only two values exist for the surplus is not crucial for my results. I show in sec-
tion 1.4.2 that the necessary condition is to have a sufficiently high density of buyers sharing close
preferences.
7The outside option cannot be normalized to zero, as it would imply that any positive outcome,
even if discounted a large number of times, is always higher than r.
8This first match is assumed to be costless. Making it costly would generate extra equilibria, not
robust to the strongest concept of equilibrium used below.
9The search cost is supported only by the buyer (wasting time a given day) and not as postponed
sales. Therefore, only the surplus of buyers is discounted. When search costs are arbitrarily small,
none of the results is affected by this assumption.
10This assumption is relaxed in section 1.4.1. The main equilibrium presented in this section is
robust to an increase in search costs.
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is never efficient. I concentrate on the case where buyers care sufficiently about
premises, show there are multiple Nash Equilibria and that only one is Coalition
Proof. Then, I briefly summariz the other case. In conclude the section by propos-
ing a theorem on price dispersion and market efficiency.
1.2.1 Main characteristics of the Nash Equilibria
The equilibrium price only takes two values that I denote by ‘high price’ p =V − r
and ‘low price’ p = v− r. The results of this subsection are mainly driven by a
mechanism that can be related to the one used by Diamond (1971) while introduc-
ing search costs in a homogeneous market.
The difference here comes from the heterogeneous tastes of the buyers. The low
price corresponds to the participation constraint of mismatched buyers. A seller that
has positive demand from those buyers when the price is exactly v− r certainly
loses the demand from the whole group by slightly increasing the price. Therefore,
there can be an incentive for sellers not to increase the price above this threshold.
Similarly, the high price corresponds to the participation constraint of buyers with a
good match, and any price above this value implies zero demand for the seller.
Lemma 1 There are only two possible prices in a Nash Equilibrium: p=V−r and
p = v− r
Sketch of the Proof. The formal proof is given in Appendix 1.6.2. Sellers are
free to choose their category at no cost. Therefore, if the expected profit of a seller
of category i is higher than the expected profit of a seller of category j, this is not an
equilibrium. While deciding whether to accept an offer or to search for another, a
buyer considers the distribution of prices in the market pˆ. As there is a continuum of
sellers, a single seller has no influence on pˆ. However, any seller knows pˆ, and can
set her price in order to make buyers of a given type accept her offer. It is always a
best response for a seller to slightly increase her price as long as she does not lose
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consumers by doing so. This can only happen for two levels of price: v− r and
V − r. At those levels, any increase in the price implies that one of the participation
constraints is no longer satisfied.
The impossibility of having an equilibrium price different from those two values
is the key factor that drives the inefficiency of any Nash Equilibrium of this model.
Indeed, either sellers sell to both types of buyers - this implies that some buyers are
not correctly matched - or they specialize in only one type and set a high price, such
that search never occurs - this implies either a share of mismatches or some buyers
leaving the market.
Proposition 1 The market outcome never exhausts all gains from trade.
Proof. (by contradiction) Assume both types of buyers search until they find a good
match. This implies that each seller is specialized in one type. Hence, as shown
in Lemma 1, it is a Best Response for every seller to set a price slightly above the
market level, even when it is exactly p= v−r. The only price in a Nash Equilibrium
is therefore p′ =V − r. At this level of price, the expected surplus on the market is
at most r and buyers never search. This is a contradiction.
In any equilibrium, a share of buyers is not correctly matched. This implies
that the total gains from trade are strictly lower than V − r. If there is a mass of
sellers of each type and if the price is strictly lower than V − r, all buyers search
and the total gains from trade tend to V − r (as δ goes to 1). This Proposition
shows the existence of a market failure. Indeed, consider instead that a monopoly
owns all the sellers. It is easy to show that, by setting a price slightly below V − r
and producing both categories, all buyers search and all the potential surplus of the
economy is extracted. However, this monopoly would eventually let the buyers with
zero surplus. As will be made clear below, competition leaves some buyers with
surplus, at the cost of an inefficiency in the matching process. Whether regulation
can help increase welfare is discussed in Section 1.3.
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1.2.2 When buyers care sufficiently about the premises
When buyers do not care sufficiently about the premises, the equilibrium corre-
sponds to a classical result of standard setting. The market provides only one of the
two categories, at a low price, there is no search and no one is excluded from the
market (I develop this result in Section 1.2.3).
When the importance of the premises increases sufficiently, or when the majority
is sufficiently large, the incentive for sellers to extract the surplus of a good match
also increases and product diversity starts to become a Nash Equilibrium. Condition
1 is necessary and sufficient to be in this case.
Condition 1 α > v−rV−r
In this Section, I consider that condition 1 is true. The interpretation is twofold.
If the ratio on the right hand side of the equation is sufficiently low, it means that
sellers can make large surplus by setting the high price and selling only to the ma-
jority type. If the left hand side is sufficiently high, it means that the demand from
the majority is large enough to compensate the loss from not attracting minority
buyers.
In this subsection, I show that there are potentially four Nash Equilibria in the
economy. Three of them coexist, depending on the values of the parameters. I list
them below. Then, I explain why I consider a more restrictive concept of equilib-
rium: Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE). I show that only one equilibrium,
ASmin, is a CPNE.
Definition 1 Tyranny of the majority (high price): T MH . All sellers choose the
category desired by the majority and sell it at the high price.
In this equilibrium, the buyers of the minority are excluded from the market.
There is no search.
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Definition 2 Tyranny of the majority (low price): T ML. All sellers chose the cate-
gory desired by the majority and sell it at the low price.
Therefore, all buyers accept the offer. There is no search.
Definition 3 Asymmetric supply - Some surplus left to the majority ASma j. There
are sellers of both categories in the market. The sellers of category A (corresponding
to the majority type a) sell at the low price and the sellers of category B sell at the
high price.
Here, the buyers of the minority type accept any offer, while the buyers of the
majority type search until they find a good match.
Definition 4 Asymmetric supply - Some surplus left to the minority ASmin. There
are sellers of both types in the market. The sellers of category B (corresponding to
the minority type b) sell at the low price and the sellers of category A sell at the high
price.
This equilibrium is the only CPNE. The buyers of the majority type accept any
offer, while the buyers of the minority type search until they find a good match.
Lemma 2 If condition 1 is true, there are exactly four potential Nash Equilibria in
this game: T MH , T ML, ASma j and ASmin. For all parameters, either T ML or ASma j
exist but never both.
Sketch of the Proof. The formal proof is given in Appendix 1.6.3. Here is the
intuition for each of the equilibria.
• T MH : it is not a best response for sellers to lower the price unless it is at most
p′ = v− r. If the price is exactly p′, the expected profit is pi ′ = v− r. This is
lower than the equilibrium profit pi = α(V − r) by condition 1. It is not a best
response for a seller to sell the other category, as the profit of the deviating
seller is at most pi ′′ = (1−α)(V − r). Which is lower than pi , since α > 12 .
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• T ML: a seller that slightly increases the price never increases her profit, as
she automatically loses a large share of the buyers. The profit of each firm is
pi ′= v−r. The only possibility to increase profit is to sell the category desired
by the minority at price p = V − r. Therefore, T ML is a Nash Equilibrium if
and only if pi ′′ < pi ′.
• ASma j: the share γ∗ of firms of category A is such that their profit is exactly
the same as the firms of category B, pi ′′ = (1−α)(V − r). A firm can increase
its profit by deviating and selling category A at the low price if and only if
pi ′′ < pi ′. Therefore, if T ML is a Nash Equilibrium, ASma j is not.
• ASmin: the share (1− γ∗) of firms of category B is such that their profit is
exactly the same as the firms of type A, pi = α(V − r). Therefore, a deviating
firm can at most receive profit pi ′ or pi ′′ which are lower by definition.
Considering the general definition of Nash Equilibrium, this economy displays
a multiplicity of equilibria, and there is no way to predict which one is expected
to be realized in practice. In the next Proposition, I use an alternative concept of
equilibrium: Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium, as defined by Bernheim, Peleg and
Whinston (1987). This more restrictive definition implies that there is no self-
enforcing deviation by a coalition of sellers that can gain from deviating. Take for
instance the first equilibrium, T MH , which is a Nash Equilibrium because no single
seller can make buyers search for it. However, there is a coalition of mass (1− γ ′)
that would benefit from selling the category desired by the minority at a low price.
If (1− γ ′) is not too high, those sellers can attract a sufficiently large number of
buyers of type b to increase their profit. This deviation is self-enforcing, as none of
those deviating sellers has any incentive to change her price or category. And there
is no self-enforcing deviation by a sub-coalition that can increase her profit by doing
so.
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By definition, in every CPNE, the sellers get the highest possible equilibrium
profit. Thus, the market failure identified here does not come from a coordination
failure among sellers. Moreover, this concept is much more realistic in the context
of this paper. Indeed, firms can communicate and exchange ideas, even if they do not
explicitly coordinate. Some sellers can for reasons unrelated to profit maximization
try to sell the other category. This can even be created from the demand side: a
coalition of buyers of the minority type could start its own business, or simply give
a certification or a label to firms who accept to sell their preferred category. All of
those effects would make the equilibrium T MH disappear.
Proposition 2 When condition 1 is fulfilled, the only Coalition-Proof Nash Equilib-
rium of this game is ASmin: the sellers of category B (corresponding to the minority
type b) sell at a low price and the sellers of category A sell at a high price. The
buyers of the majority type accept any offer, while the buyers of the minority type
search until they find a good match.
Sketch of the Proof. The formal proof is provided in Appendix 1.6.4. In T MH there
exists a self-enforcing coalition that can increase its profit by selling the type desired
by the minority at the low price. In T ML and ASma j, the profit of sellers is strictly
lower than in ASmin. Therefore, a self-enforcing deviation of a coalition of mass 1
increases its profit by playing ASmin.
A key factor to understand the equilibrium outcome is that, as sellers are free to
choose their category at no cost, the expected profit of all sellers is equivalent. The
profit of sellers of category A is independent of their number and is pi = α(V − r).
Hence, the number of firms of category B is determined by the difference between
high and low price (how much extra surplus a seller can extract by specializing in
the majority type) and the share of buyers of the minority (how many buyers will
search to reach a seller of category B). This equilibrium value is given by
γ∗ = 1− 1−α
α
v− r
V − v . (1.1)
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It must be noted that the category desired by the majority of buyers can be produced
by a minority of sellers in equilibrium.
Coming back to the TV screen example provided in the introduction, this result
implies that if a majority of bar goers prefer TV screen, they are indifferent between
high price bars with a TV screen and low price bars without. Buyers who dislike TV
screens however, would never consume in a high-price bar with a TV screen. They
keep searching until they find a low-price bar corresponding to their preferences,
i.e. without a TV. If high profit can be made by sellers specializing in those cus-
tomers that like TV screen, the model predicts the market to reflect the preferences
of buyers. But this is not always true, and the market outcome can perfectly display
a large majority of bars without TV screen, patronized by all types of buyers, and
only a few bars with a TV screen, only patronized by TV lovers. Bars without a TV
have no incentive to increase their price, as they would lose TV lovers. Bars with a
TV have no incentive to decrease their price, as it would not be sufficient to attract
consumers with other preferences.
1.2.3 When buyers care less about the premises
Assume now that condition 1 is not satisfied, i.e.
α <
v− r
V − r
This corresponds to assuming that the relative surplus generated by a good match
with respect to a mismatch is quite small, given the size of the majority. The intu-
ition is that of a standard setting. There is only one category sold in equilibrium, at
the low price.
Proposition 3 When condition 1 is not fulfilled, there is only one category provided
in equilibrium. It is sold at low price, there is no search and no buyers are excluded
from the market.
Equilibria 21
Sketch of the Proof. The formal proof is given in Appendix 1.6.5. The profit
of each firm is pi ′ = v− r. There is no incentive for any firm to increase the price,
as the profit would be at most pi = α(V − r). This is lower than pi ′ as condition 1 is
not fulfilled. As the potential surplus from specializing in one category is not high
enough, all sellers attract both types. Product diversity is not a Nash Equilibrium.
If sellers set the low price but attract only one type of buyers, each seller has an
incentive to slightly increase the price. And if one category is sold at the high price
and the other at the low price, the profit of the latter sellers is at least pi ′ = v− r,
higher than what she can get by specialization.
As in the previous case, the market alone fails to provide an efficient level of
product diversity. Note that a market where only category B, preferred by the mi-
nority, is produced is also a Nash Equilibrium. Back to the TV example again, this
depicts a world where most buyers like TV screen and no bar provides this service.
This is not a sufficiently important issue for buyers, and a bar would not increase its
profit by installing the screen and specialize in TV lovers.
1.2.4 Price dispersion and market efficiency: a Theorem
Theorem 1 When a decentralized market displays product diversity in Equilibrium,
there is always price dispersion and a share of buyers searching until they find a
good match. Still, the market is inefficient to match the sellers with the tastes of the
buyers.
Proof. By propositions 2 and 3, when there is product diversity in a Coalition Proof
Nash Equilibrium, there is also price dispersion, and a strictly positive share of
buyers of type a are matched with sellers of category B. By lemma 2, in the only
non CPNE with product diversity, there is price dispersion and a positive share of
buyers of type b are matched with sellers of category A
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When buyers care sufficiently about the premises, a decentralized market where
rational buyers share the same information and where sellers have the same pro-
duction costs can display price dispersion. But this price dispersion is a feature of
an equilibrium where a share of the buyers buy to sellers that do not match their
preferences. This result holds regardless of the equilibrium concept, as it holds for
any Nash Equilibrium.
1.3 Welfare and sandardization
The objective of this Section is to discuss the welfare implications of the results
presented above. I mainly focus on the case where condition 1 is true. First, I discuss
the welfare impact of the simplest possible regulation: standardization, to force
the sellers to choose the majority type. I show that this always increases aggregate
consumers’ surplus. This regulation also increases total welfare when the market
does not provide enough of the type desired by the majority. However, this policy
is never Pareto Improving, as it decreases the surplus of the buyers of the majority.
Then, I explain how setting a market for licenses can increase total surplus and be
Pareto Improving: there is an extra revenue from licenses that does not decrease the
surplus of buyers or the profit of sellers. I close this Section by presenting the result
for the case when condition 1 is not fulfilled.
Lemma 3 If firms are only allowed to sell category A, the only Coalition-Proof
Nash Equilibrium is T ML: all firms sell category A, at the low price. All buyers
accept the offer. There is no search.
Proof. The two potential Nash Equilibria are T ML, with p = v− r and T MH , with
p′′ =V − r.
(i) T MH is not a CPNE.11 There exists a coalition ξ of sellers that can increase its
11Even if there is no product diversity in this game, this result differs from the paradox raised by
Diamond (1971). T MH is the equilibrium that maximizes joint profit.
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profit by setting p= v−r, as buyers will search until they find a seller at price v− r.
Slightly increasing the price decreases profit, so the deviation is self-enforcing.
(ii) It follows that T ML is a CPNE. A mass 1 of sellers can increase its profit by
setting p′′, but it is not self-enforcing since a subcoalition ξ of sellers can increase
its profit by setting p = v− r.
The question is to find out whether standardization can be welfare improving. A
social planner can broadly have two main objectives: (i) maximize the total surplus
(ii) maximize the surplus of consumers.12
While considering the aggregate surplus of consumers, it is easy to show that this
regulation always leads to an improvement. Indeed, in the unregulated equilibrium
ASmin, the minority buyers receive surplus S = V − (v− r), corresponding to the
difference between their valuation for the good match and the low price, while the
majority buyers receive a surplus equivalent to the outside option. In the regulated
equilibrium T ML, the majority buyers receive S while the minority buyers receive a
surplus equivalent to the outside option.
While considering total surplus, there is a trade-off between the profit of sellers,
which is lower in the regulated equilibrium, and the surplus of buyers. The key
factor is to know if the loss in profit due to specialization is compensated by the
gain in consumer surplus. Still, this is not Pareto Improving, as the expected utility
of the buyers of type b is reduced.
Proposition 4 If the gains from specialization are sufficiently high, the unregulated
market supplies a large share of the category desired by the majority, and regulation
decreases total welfare. Otherwise, regulation increases total welfare.
Sketch of the Proof. The formal proof is provided in Appendix 1.6.6. Regula-
tion increases welfare if the total surplus is higher in T ML than in ASmin. This can
12For instance, the latter is the official statement of the European Commission for market regula-
tion policies.
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be written as
αV +(1−α)v > V − (1−α)(v− r)
⇔ V − v < v− r (1.2)
This relates to the value of γ∗ presented in equation 1.1. If the gain from special-
ization is high, the share of sellers of the majority type is also high, and regulation
is not welfare improving. But when the gain is lower, the market does not supply
enough of the majority type and regulation increases total welfare.
While price regulation seems to be mostly a theoretical object,13 a more realistic
alternative policy is to implement a market for licenses. Assume that a license is the
only legal way for sellers to choose the category desired by the minority. The social
planner sets a number of licenses sufficiently high for the minority type to search
when sellers set the low price. In our case with search cost arbitrarily small, the
number of licenses is also arbitrarily small. In this case, one can expect almost
every buyer to benefit from a good match, and therefore the equilibrium to be close
to the first best. More generally, for a share 1− γ∗ of licenses, the market price of a
licence, L, is the solution to
α(V − r) = α(v− r)+ 1−α
1− γ∗ (v− r)−L
Depending on the level of search costs δ , the optimal share of licenses 1− γ∗ is
the smallest that ensures search from buyers of type b. On can show (see appendix
1.6.3) that this is the solution to
1− γ∗ = r
V − v
1−δ
δ
13Among other because v− r is not constant through time and the market outcome is the only way
to measure it. Also because this model only reflects the specific profits of the platform that manages
the premises but not the price of the good itself.
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The sellers of the minority type still set the low price.14 Those sellers set the
lowest price but are also the ones that pay for the license. The profit of sellers and
the surplus of buyers is exactly the same as in ASmin. The difference in total welfare
comes from the revenue of the licenses.
When condition 1 is not fulfilled, it is straightforward that if firms are only
allowed to sell category A, this weakly increases total welfare. If a system of li-
censes is introduced as described before, the equilibrium changes to ASmin (with
a constrained share of sellers of category A), therefore increasing the price of the
majority category for which no license is paid. Thus, licensing decreases aggregate
consumers’ welfare - but increases total welfare as more consumers obtain a good
match.
1.4 Extensions
1.4.1 Increasing search costs
The objective of this extension is to present the additional conditions on discount
factor δ for the existence of the various equilibria when search costs are not ar-
bitrarily small. The computations are provided in the formal proof of each of the
equilibria in Appendix 1.6.3.
a. When buyers care sufficiently about the premises
When condition 1 is true:
• T MH is always an equilibrium.
• T ML is an equilibrium if (1−α) < (v−r)(V−r) and δ >
αV−(v−r)
α(V−(v−r)) . The first con-
dition excludes specialization in the minority type, the second condition ex-
14Slightly increasing the price is not a best response since it implies losing the demand from
buyers of the majority type. And there is no self-enforcing deviation of a coalition towards a higher
price.
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cludes the possibility for a seller of category A to increase the price, still have
demand from majority buyers and increase its profit.
• ASmin is an equilibrium if δ > αr(1−α)(v−r)+αr . This condition ensures that there
is a sufficiently large number of sellers of category B for buyers of type b to
actually search.
• ASma j is an equilibrium if 1−α > v−rV−r and δ > (1−α)rα(v−r)+(1−α)r . The first con-
dition ensures there are enough buyers of the minority type and that enough
surplus can be extracted from them. The second condition ensures that there
is a sufficiently large number of sellers of category A for buyers of type a to
actually search.
The main result is that for values of α not too close to 1, the equilibria are robust
to increases in search costs. When search costs increase too much, the number of
equilibria decreases. One can show that if T ML is a Nash Equilibrium, ASmin is also
a Nash Equilibrium (the reverse is not true).
Example 3 Consider values of r,v,V such that T ML exists, and therefore ASma j
does not: r = 1,v= 2,V = 3. T MH is always an equilibrium, T ML is an equilibrium
for any δ > 3α−12α (the right-hand side is always lower than 1 and increasing in α),
ASmin is an equilibrium for any δ > α .
Example 4 Consider values of r,v,V such that ASma j exists, and therefore T ML
does not: r = 1,v = 2,V = 4. T MH is always an equilibrium, ASma j is an equilib-
rium (iff α < 23 ) for any δ > 1−α and ASmin is an equilibrium for any δ > α .
b. When buyers care less about the premises
When condition 1 is not fulfilled, both Nash Equilibria presented in Section 1.2.3
hold for any value of δ . Equilibria with product diversity can arise when δ de-
creases. One can show that, as long as δ < 2r2r+V−v , there exists values of γ
− < γ+
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such that for any γ ∈ (γ−,γ+) buyers buy any type without search. If buyers accept
the offer regardless of the premises, sellers are indifferent between both categories.
The higher the search cost, the broader the interval in which those equilibria exist.
1.4.2 A continuum of types
The specification of my model relies on assuming two discrete types, and two dif-
ferent values of consumer surplus. The objective of this extension is to give a con-
tinuous interpretation of the main equilibrium of my model, ASmin.
As in the basic specification, there is a continuum of buyers and sellers of mass 1
and a fraction α > 12 of buyers of type a. A good match yields surplus V and buyers
have an outside option of value r. Assume now that the valuation of a mismatch
is drawn, for each buyer, from a continuous distribution f with support [r,V ]. We
try to characterize an equilibrium where sellers of categories A and B extract all the
surplus of buyers of type a, and where buyers of type b search for sellers of type B
that leave them some surplus.
First, I assume this equilibrium exists. I define the total profit for a firm of cat-
egory A, and the total profit (and the maximization problem) for a firm of category
B. Then, I derive the new value of γ . Finally, I show under which conditions it is
actually an equilibrium.
The total profit for a firm of category A is
piA = α(V − r)
as in the discrete case.
To compute the total profit of a firm of category B, with price pB ∈ (r,V − r),
one has to distinguish:
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• The demand from buyers of type a who pick up the seller first. In this equi-
librium, firms of type A give no more surplus than the outside option. This
demand can be rewritten as Da(pB), with Da(V − r) = 0 and Da(r) = α
• The demand from buyers of type b who pick up the seller first, plus the demand
from buyers of type b who actually search (as p∗B <V − r): 1−α1−γ ,
piB = (Da(pB)+
1−α
1− γ )pB.
Hence, the maximization problem yields
D′a(p∗B)p∗B
Da(p∗B)
=
1−α
1− γ .
A first comment is that, for such an equilibrium to exist, one needs a point with
sufficiently high density (so the elasticity of the demand is high enough), and a share
of buyers of type a sufficiently high (so the relative importance of this part of the
demand is high enough).
Moreover, one needs a sufficiently small value of γ , such that the ‘search’ part
of the demand, which is constant as long as pB <V −r, is not too high. Other things
being equal, the smaller γ , the highest the elasticity of total demand for a seller of
category B.
However, even if γ is taken as exogenous in the maximization problem of an
individual seller, it is still determined by the expected profit of a seller of category
B. The expected profit of both categories of sellers being equal, γ must satisfy.
γ∗ = 1− (1−α)pB
α(V − r)−Da(pB)pB
which, for any p < p∗B is strictly decreasing in pB. This is quite intuitive, as for
any p < p∗B increasing the price increases the profit of a firm of category B, it also
increases the number of firms of category B, and decreases the ‘search’ component
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of the demand.
Those prices correspond to a Nash Equilibrium if there exists a solution γ∗ ∈
(0,1). This is true if there is a sufficiently high concentration of types, at a point
that yields a sufficiently high surplus of a mismatch, and with a sufficiently large
majority of buyers of type a. This corresponds to the same intuition as the conditions
of existence of this equilibrium in the discrete case.
If those conditions are satisfied, setting another price is not a best response for
a firm of category A (a price higher then V − r yields zero demand, a price lower
does not increase demand but decreases profit). The price of firms of category B is
an equilibrium by definition, as it is the result of individual profit maximization.
1.5 Conclusion
This model relies heavily on two assumptions: the sellers have to make a choice -
they cannot serve both types - and no seller has sufficient market power to attract
buyers by changing her price. The first assumption is the reason why this model
applies to premises - which affect all the goods and services - and not to the goods
and services themselves. The second assumption is the key reason for the differ-
ences between the results of this model - with competitive markets - and the recent
oligopoly models cited in the review of the literature.
I have shown that when buyers care sufficiently about the premises, the market
does not exhaust all the gains from trade: a share of the buyers is not correctly
matched. As long as search costs are not too high, the efficiency is independent
of search costs, and so is the average price on the market. Therefore, the perfectly
competitive price is a knife-edge case, since any arbitrarily small search costs make
it disappear.
When the market outcome does not reflect the preferences of buyers, a social
planner can increase aggregate welfare by forcing firms to sell only the type desired
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by the majority. This can be a rationale to consider standardization laws, assuming
they reflect the tastes of the majority, as something potentially more effective than a
simple transfer of utility from the minority to the majority type. However, this not
Pareto Improving among consumers, and this is also expected to lower the profit
of firms, which may therefore oppose such a regulation. Another policy enabling
to increase total welfare without hurting sellers is to create a market for licenses,
with as few licenses of the minority type as needed to make the buyers of this type
actually search. Under this policy, all sellers and buyers get exactly the same surplus
as in the unregulated market, and the extra surplus from a higher matching rate
is extracted by the social planner, or by whoever owns the property rights on the
licenses.
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1.6 Technical Appendixes
1.6.1 Two preliminary lemmas
The two following lemmas are used in several of the following proofs:
Lemma 4 Both categories of sellers have the same expected profit in equilibrium.
Proof. Sellers are free to choose their type at no cost. Therefore, if the expected
profit of a seller selling a service of category i is higher than the expected profit of
a seller of category j, this is not an equilibrium. It is a best response for a seller of
category j to sell category i.
Lemma 5 For a given level of price, a seller sets her price in a way to decide what
kind of buyers accept her offer, but has no influence on who searches for her.
Proof. This Lemma is close to Diamond (1971). While deciding whether to accept
an offer or to search for another, a buyer considers the distribution of prices in the
market pˆ. As there is a continuum of sellers, a single seller has no influence on pˆ.
However, a seller knows pˆ, and can set her price in order to make buyers of a given
type accept her offer.
1.6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider first the following definitions:
Definition 5 The participation constraint for a seller of category j is satisfied for
a buyer of type i if the seller offers a price leaving the buyer of type i utility higher
than the reservation utility r. I denote this by PC ji , with i ∈ {a,b}, j ∈ {A,B}.
Definition 6 The incentive compatibility constraint for a seller of type j is satis-
fied for a buyer of type i if the seller offers a utility higher than her (discounted)
expected utility if she stays in the market. I denote this by IC ji , with i ∈ {a,b}, j
∈ {A,B}.
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Definition 7 A buyer of type i accepts the offer of a seller of category j if and only
if PC ji and IC
j
i are satisfied.
This is the proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. PART 1: p >V − r is never a NE.
(i) Consider a pair i, j with i 6= j.For a firm i setting price p, PCii is given by V − p≥
r,⇔ p≤V − r and PCij is given by v− p≥ r⇔ p≤ v− r.
(ii) A seller always makes a positive profit. Assume all firms sell at price zero and
make zero profit. Slightly increasing the price is a profitable deviation for a firm of
type i, as there exist p′ > 0 such that ICii is satisfied, i.e. V − p′ ≥ δV.
(iii) As a corollary of (ii), it is never a best response for a firm to have zero demand.
Hence, p >V − r is never a best response, because no buyer ever accepts the offer.
PART 2: v− r < p <V − r is never a NE.
Consider a firm of category i. Denote the expected surplus proposed by a firm of
category i to a buyer of type j. Sij. As p > v− r, PCij is not satisfied. The firm only
considers buyers of type i, hence fulfilling ICii and PC
i
i . As p <V −r, PCii is already
satisfied.
ICii is always satisfied when the firm sets a price p
′ such that
Sii(p
′)≥max(δSii(pˆi),δS ji (pˆ j)).
(i) If max(δ Sii(pˆi),δ S
j
i (pˆ j)) = δ S
i
i(pˆi), there exists a price p
′ > pˆi such that ICii
is satisfied. Indeed, Sii(p
′) ≥ δ Sii(pˆi) for some p′ > pˆi. Hence, it is always a best
response for a firm to increase the price as long as PCii is satisfied.
(ii) If max(δ Sii(pˆi),δ S
j
i (pˆ j)) = δ S
j
i (pˆ j), then it is a BR for the firm to change
and sell category j at price p′ > p j. Indeed:
a) By Lemma 4, in equilibrium, pii = pi j.
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b) As max(δ Sii(pˆi),δ S
j
i (pˆ j)) = δ S
j
i (pˆ j), IC
j
j is satisfied and from PART 1, p <
V − r.
c) For the same reason, if there exist some firms selling at price pˆi in equilibrium,
they must have non negative demand. Hence, ICii is satisfied. Then, as S
i
i(pˆi) <
S ji (pˆ j), IC
j
i is also satisfied, with S
j
i (pˆ j)> max(δ S
i
i(pˆi),δ S
j
i (pˆ j)).
d) Hence, there exists some p′ > p j such that IC
j
i is still satisfied.
PART 3: p < v− r is never a NE.
Here, for both categories of firms and both types of buyers, PC is satisfied.
(i) For both categories of firms selling to both types of buyers to be a Nash Equi-
librium, profit must be the same. As demand is 1 for any firm, it is only possible
if p is the same for any firm. Also, ICaB and IC
B
a have to be binding. Indeed, if it
is not satisfied, a type of buyer searches. And if it is not exactly binding, slightly
increasing the price is a best response, i.e. for ICaB
v− p = δγ(V − p)
∞
∑
i=0
δ i(1− γ)i
v− p = δ (1− γ)(V − p)
1−δ (1− γ) .
And similarly, ICBa
v− p = δ (1− γ)(V − p)
1−δγ .
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This is only possible if γ = 12 . But then, both equalities yield
(1−δγ)(V − p) = δγ(V − p)
(1−δγ) = δγ
1− δ
2
=
δ
2
δ = 1
this is, no search cost at all.
(ii) If a firm is interested in only one type of seller, the reasoning becomes the same
as in PART 2, there is always an incentive to increase the price.
1.6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
To prove the Lemma, I first prove that each of the four potential Nash equilibrium
exist under some conditions, and then that no other equilibrium can exist.
a. TMH is a Nash Equilibrium:
Proof. (i) It is not a best response for a seller to sell category B and set price v− r <
p′ ≤V − r, because the profit will be at most (1−α)(V − r)< α(V − r).
(ii) It is not a best response for a seller to sell category B and set price p′ ≤ v− r.
By Lemma 5 a seller cannot make people search for it. So, the profit will be at most
v− r < α(V − r) (by condition 1).
(iii) It is not a best response for a seller to sell category A at price p′ ≤ v− r. On
her own, a seller can’t make buyer search for her. So, the profit will be at most
v− r < α(V − r) (by condition 1).
(iv) It is not a best response for a seller to sell category A at price v− r < p′ <
V − r. By condition 5 this yields demand α and therefore profit strictly lower than
α(V − r).
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b. TML is a Nash Equilibrium iff (1−α)(V − r)< v− r:
Proof. Profit in equilibrium is piA = v− r.
(i) It is not a best response for a firm to sell category B and set price p= v− r as
it will lose all buyers of type a.
(ii) It is not a best response for a firm to sell category B and set price p′ =V − r,
because the profit will be (1−α)(V − r)< v− r.
(iii) It is not a best response for a firm of category A to increase the price. Con-
sider p˜, the threshold price such that for any p′′ > p˜ buyers of type a start searching.
There is no incentive to set p > p˜ as it leads to zero profit. Neither is it an incentive
to set V − r < p < p˜. If p˜ <V − r, it is not a BR to set p′′′ < p˜ as this yields profit
α p′′′ < α p˜. Therefore, we only consider an increase of price to exactly p˜. Define
p˜ = v− r+ ε . Buyers of type a do not search as long as
V − (v− r+ ε)≥ δ (V − (v− r)
⇔ ε = (1−δ )(V − (v− r))
since the condition is binding. Therefore, it is a best response for a firm to increase
the price iff
α(v− r+ ε)≥ v− r
⇔ δ > αV − (v− r)
α(V − (v− r)) .
c. ASmin is a Nash Equilibrium:
Proof. A buyer waits if her expected surplus is higher than the reservation util-
ity, i.e.
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⇔ r < δ (1− γ)
∞
∑
i=0
γ iδ i(V − v+ r)
⇔ r < δ (1− γ)
1− γδ (V − v+ r).
this simplifies to
V − v > r
1− γ
1−δ
δ
.
The profit in equilibrium is given by:
For a firm of category A: piA = α(V − r).
For a firm of category B: piB = α(v− r)+ 1−α1−γ (v− r).
I want to find γ such that piA = piB. Write:
α(V − r) = α(v− r)+ 1−α
1− γ (v− r)
⇔ (1− γ)α(V − v) = (1−α)(v− r)
⇔ γ∗ = 1− 1−α
α
v− r
V − v .
It is actually an equilibrium: (i) At isoprofit, consumers of type b actually search.
We know γ∗ = 1− 1−αα v−rV−v . I want V − v > r1−γ 1−δδ for buyers of type b to wait.
Replacing γ by γ∗ yields 1−αα >
r
v−r
1−δ
δ . This is always true when δ → 1. The
condition on δ can be conveniently rewritten as δ > αr(1−α)(v−r)+αr .
(ii) In equilibrium, it is not a best response to sell category A at price p′A ≤ v− r.
This yields at most profit piA = v− r which is lowering the profit by condition 1.
(iii) In equilibrium, no one wants to produce category B at price v− r < p′B ≤V − r.
Increasing the price make consumers of type a lose, and yields at most profit pi ′B =
(1−α)(V − r) which is lower than piB as I have assumed α ≥ 12 .
(iv) In equilibrium, it is not a best response to sell category A at price v− r < pA <
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V − r. Demand is at most α and the firm therefore makes lower profits.
(v) It is not a best response to change of category. There is isoprofit at equilibrium
and, for any γ > γ∗ the best response of any firm is to supply category B (as piB is
an increasing function of γ).
d. ASma jis a Nash Equilibrium iff (1−α)(V − r)> v− r:
Proof. (i) Selling category A at price p′ >V − r yields lower profit as, by definition
buyers of type a reject the offer and search.
(ii) Selling category A at price p′ =V −r is not a best response as long as buyers
of type a reject the offer and search.
(iii) Selling category A at price v− r < p′ < V − r is not a best response, as by
Lemma 5 it does not increase the demand, but, by lowering the price it lowers the
profit.
(iv) Selling category A at price p′ < v− r is not a best response as by Lemma 5
it does not increase the demand, but, by lowering the price it lowers the profit.
(v) Selling category B at price p′ < v− r is not a best response as by Lemma 5
no one specifically search for the firm and therefore profit is at most v− r, which is
lower than (1−α)(V − r).
(vi) Selling category B at price v− r ≤ p′ < V − r is not a best response as by
Lemma 5.
it does not increase the demand from buyers of type b and as long as buyers of
type a reject the offer and search.
(vii) Selling category B at price p′ > V − r yields lower profit as, by definition
buyers of type a reject the offer and search.
(viii) Using the same reasoning as for ASmin, (ii) and (iv) are true when δ >
(1−α)r
α(v−r)+(1−α)r .
Now, to complete the proof, it only remains to show that no other equilibrium
may exist.
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e. No other equilibria exist under condition 1
Proof. I want to show that the previous equilibria are the only existing ones when
condition 1 is true. Therefore, I still have to get rid of the following alternatives.
(1) All sellers sell category B at price pB = V − r. Selling category A at price
pA =V − r is a profitable deviation as it yields profit α(V − r)> (1−α)(V − r), by
α > 12 .
(2) All sellers sell category B at price pB = v− r. Selling category A at price pA =
V − r is a profitable deviation as it yields profit α(V − r)> v− r, by condition 1.
(4) A fraction γ of sellers sell category A at price pA = v− r while a fraction (1− γ)
sells category B at price pB = v− r. (i) If buyers don’t search for the seller of their
category then, by setting pA = V − r a seller of category A does not lose buyers of
type a and therefore increases profit (ii) If buyers do search then, a seller only serves
buyers of its category, and there must exist a price p′ > v− r such that buyers still
accept the offer. Thus setting p′ is a profitable deviation.
(5) A fraction γ of sellers sell category A at price pA =V −r while a fraction (1−γ)
sells category B at price pB = V − r. As α ≥ 12 one can never have the same profit
when γ 6= 1.
(6) Given Lemma 1, I have exhausted all the potential Nash Equilibria.
1.6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. ASmin is coalition-proof. By Lemma 1, any Nash-Equilibrium implies ei-
ther p = v− r or p = V − r. Selling category B at p = V − r is not a profitable
deviation, as demand would be zero. Selling category A at p = v− r can increase
joint profit of a coalition of sellers, but is not self-enforcing. Indeed, as the demand
for such firms only comes from buyers of type A, each seller has an incentive to
slightly increase the price - the participation constraint of buyers of type b is non-
binding.
TMH is not coalition-proof. There exist a coalition of size (1− γ ′)< (1− γ∗) that
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would increase her profit by selling a good of category B at price p = v− r. Such
a deviation is self-enforcing, as this price is the best response of any member of the
coalition given that all the other members play the same strategy. Hence, Tyranny
of the majority at high price is not a coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium.
TML and ASma j are not coalition-proof. As the profit of each firm is higher in
ASmin, and as ASmin is coalition-proof, a coalition of mass 1 always has an incen-
tive to choose the equilibrium ASmin, and this strategy is self-enforcing.
1.6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
There is a Nash Equilibrium where all sellers sell the good desired by the ma-
jority at the high price:
Proof. (i) Buyers of type a buy without search (surplus V − v+ r > r).
(ii) Buyers of type b buy without search (surplus r).
(iii) It is not a BR to sell category A at price v− r < p′A ≤V − r. This decreases the
profit to at most pi ′A = α(V − r) < v− r
(iv) It is not a BR for a firm to sell category B at price pB ≤ v− r. This yields at
most profit piB = (1−α)(v− r). Why? Because buyers of type a wait15 to match a
buyer of their type, while buyers of type b do not search for the deviating firm.
(v) It is not a BR for a firm to sell category B at price v− r < p′B ≤ V − r. This
yields at most profit pi ′B = (1−α)(V − r). This is smaller because condition 1 is not
fulfilled and α ≥ 12 .
There is a Nash Equilibrium where all sellers sell the good desired by the
minority at high price:
Proof. (i) Buyers of type b buy without search (surplus V − v+ r > r).
(ii) Buyers of type a buy without search (surplus r).
(iii) It is not a BR for a firm to sell category A at price v− r < p′
A
< V − r. This
15If condition 2 is false, sellers are indifferent.
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decreases the profit to at most piA = α(V − r) [profit loss by the fact that condition
1 is not fulfilled].
(iv) It is not a BR for a firm to sell category A at price p′A ≤ v− r. This yields profit
at most pi ′A = α(v−r). Why ? Because consumers of type 2 wait16 to match a buyer
of their type, while buyers of type a do not search for the deviating firm.
(v) It is not a BR for a firm to sell category B at price v−r < p′B≤V −r. This yields
profit pi ′B = (1−α)(V − r). This is smaller because condition 1 is not fulfilled and
α ≥ 12 .
Consider the following condition:
Condition 2 δ < 2rV−v+2r
If condition 2 is true, there exist threshold values (γ−,γ+) such that, for any
γ− < γ < γ+, buyers accept any offer without search and sellers are indifferent
between both types. Any γ ∈ (γ−,γ+), with γ− = V−v+rV−v − rδ (V−v) and γ+ =
1− γ−, with price pB = pA = v− r is a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. (i) Matched buyers buy without search (surplus V − v+ r > r).
(ii) Mismatched buyers buy without search as long as γ ∈ (γ−,γ+).
(iii) It is not a BR for a firm to sell category A at price v− r < p′A ≤ V − r. This
decreases the profit to at most pi ′A = α(V − r) [profit loss by the fact that condition
1 is not fulfilled].
(iv) It is not a BR for a firm to sell category B at price v− r < p′B ≤ V − r. This
yields at most profit pi ′B = (1−α)(V − r). This is smaller because condition 1 is not
fulfilled and α ≥ 12 .
(iv) Firms are indifferent between producing category A or category B at price pA =
pB = v− r, as, for any value of γ,we have piA = piB = v− r, by (i) and (ii), which
satisfy isoprofit.
16If condition 2 is false, sellers are indifferent.
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Proof that no other equilibria exist when condition 1 is not fulfilled
Proof. I want to show that the previous equilibria are the only existing ones when
condition 1 is not fulfilled. Therefore, I still have to get rid of the following alterna-
tives:
(1) All sellers sell category B at price pB = V − r. Selling category A at price
pA =V − r always yields higher profit since α ≥ 12 .
(2) All sellers sell category A at price pA = V − r. As condition 1 is not fulfilled,
reducing price to p′A = v− r increases profit.
(4) A fraction γ of sellers sell category A at price pA =V −r while a fraction (1−γ)
sells category B at price pB = v− r. Sellers selling category A do not make buyers
of type a search (yields surplus ’r’). Then, profit is at most α(V − r) < v− r since
condition 1 is not fulfilled.
(5) A fraction γ of sellers sell category A at price pA =V −r while a fraction (1−γ)
sells category B at price pB = V − r. Such a price is too high to attract. Hence, as
α ≥ 12 one can never have the same expected profit for both categories.
(6) A fraction γ of sellers produces category A at price pA = v− r and a fraction of
sellers 1− γ produce category B at price pB =V − r. This means sellers of category
B make profit piB = (1−α)(V − r). Then, if isoprofit is satisfied, it is a BR for any
seller to produce category A at price pA =V − r and get profit piA = α(V − r)> piB.
(7) Given Lemma 1, I have exhausted all the potential Nash Equilibria.
1.6.6 Proof of Proposition 4
First, I compute the total surplus in the two potential equilibria, second I compare
the two surpluses to find the condition for T ML to be preferred to ASmin:
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Total surplus in T ML:
Sellers: v− r
Buyers of type a : V − v+ r
Buyers of type b : r
Total: (v− r)+α(V − v+ r)+(1−α)r = αV +(1−α)v
Total surplus in ASmin
Sellers: α(V − r)
Buyers of type a : r
Buyers of type b : V − v+ r (*)
Total: α(V − r)+αr+(1−α)(V − v+ r) =V − (1−α)(v− r)
(*) (as (1− γ)(V − v+ r)∑∞i=0 γ iδ i = (1−γ)(V−v+r)1−γδ , and δ → 1)
Hence, T ML is preferred to ASmin iff
αV +(1−α)v > V − (1−α)(v− r)
⇔ V − v < v− r.
Chapter 2
On the economic impact of smoking
bans in bars and restaurants
The introduction of smoking ban laws in Europe and the in US over the last decades
has generated an important debate on public health and economic concerns. Four
stylized facts which I discuss thoroughly below stand out from the empirical litera-
ture: first, smoking bans do not reduce the profitability of restaurants, quite the con-
trary. Second, in most cases, the market alone fails to supply non smoking premises
before a ban is enforced. Third, the support for smoking bans typically increases
after a smoking ban is enforced. Fourth, the impact on bars is more contrasted, most
likely a decrease in employment after the ban. Why does the market fail to adjust
before the ban ? Why should the effect be different in restaurants than in bars ?
Do people actually change of preferences due to the existence of a ban? The latter
questions are difficult to answer rationally based on the classical economic theory.1
The decision to allow smoking or not can be related to the type of horizontal
differentiation I study in the first chapter. Bars and restaurants have to take a de-
cision (allow smoking or not) that affects all consumers in the room. However, it
1For instance, Adda et al. (2009) show that, in a Hotelling environment, the market provides only
smoking premises. But it does not explain how this can be the case with a majority of nonsmokers.
And why the support for bans would be influenced by the presence of the bans.
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differs in the sense that (i) people typically do not go alone to a bar or a restaurant.
There is an externality within groups when they do not share the same preferences
regarding the smoking environment. I assume utility to be non transferable within
groups ; (ii) bars and restaurants are imperfect substitutes. Substitution effects can
lead to a misinterpretation of the changes in the profit of firms.
In this paper, I extend the model presented in the first chapter to account for the
existence of groups of consumers, with heterogeneous preferences and Non Trans-
ferable Utility (NTU) within the groups. There are three types of groups: groups
of smokers, nonsmokers, and mixed groups (groups with both smokers and non-
smokers). Due to NTU, a seller wanting to attract mixed groups must meet both
the participation constraints of smokers and nonsmokers. These groups are there-
fore not a "third" type of buyers, but a combination of the two first types, with a
participation constraint more complex to meet. I show that, in the presence of prod-
uct diversity, only homogenous groups of nonsmokers attend nonsmoking premises
while all other groups attend smoking premises. A mixed group initially matched
with a nonsmoking restaurant leaves the market without buying: the nonsmokers of
the group do not want to pay the search cost to find a smoking place. And the non-
smoking premises do not meet the participation constraint of smokers. In this case,
a policy of licenses (defining a small share of smoking restaurants) decreases total
demand, as it increases the number of those ‘conflictual’ cases. A policy of smok-
ing ban increases total demand, but decreases the profit of firms (as it decreases
the prices). Without mixed groups, a policy of licenses is always maximizing total
welfare. In the presence of mixed group, it may be dominated by a policy of com-
plete smoking bans. One of the two policies is always maximizing the total welfare.
None of the policies is Pareto Improving.
To understand better the empirical puzzles I also add the possibility of substi-
tution between bars and restaurants. Following the four stylized facts mentioned
above, I show that: (i) substitution effect explains that, if the bans are not enforced
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simultaneously in restaurants and bars, restaurants may increase their profit due to
the ban ; (ii) in presence of a majority of nonsmokers, the market can provide a
minority of nonsmoking premises ; (iii) before a ban, nonsmoking premises are a
niche market, only attended by nonsmokers. After a ban, those premises have an
incentive to accommodate all types of consumers, by lowering prices. This change
in the price structure explains the change in the support for nonsmoking environ-
ments by consumers ; (iv) bars may be seriously hurt by a ban affecting them if it
has been previously enforced in restaurants. The effect of a ban in restaurants alone
is to increase the share of smoking bars, and therefore increases their specialization
in the minority type.
In the presence of premises diversity in the market, there are two sources of
inefficiency that go in opposite directions. The first one, already documented in
the first chapter, is that the market may provide too many premises corresponding
to the taste of the minority, implying a large share of the majority buyers being
mismatched. The second one, related to the group effect, is that the market may
not provide enough premises corresponding to the taste of the minority, implying a
large share of mixed groups leaving the market without buying.
In general, smoking ban decisions are enforced for reasons of health policy.2
The objective of this paper is not to discuss this issue, but to understand the mar-
ket mechanism. The smoking ban example is convenient to study as it is a largely
debated policy issue that has inspired a vast empirical literature. Moreover, the ques-
tion of the efficiency of a decentralized market to provide product diversity when
consumers buy in groups is much more general. Examples include most social or
leisure activity when decisions have to be taken cooperatively, such as (movie) the-
aters, holidays, ...
2For instance Allwright (2004, p.811) argues that: ‘Given the seriousness of the health con-
sequences of exposure to passive smoke, the economic argument is hardly relevant. For example,
would anyone seriously propose that because removing asbestos from buildings costs money and
may put marginal businesses out of business, workers should continue to work in dangerously con-
taminated buildings?’
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In the next section, I present the existing analysis of smoking ban policies, and
show how empirical results contradict those predictions. Section 2 presents the setup
of the model. The decentralized equilibrium is characterized in section 3. Different
scenarios of smoking bans are studied in section 4. I conclude in section 5.
2.1 Three theories and why they fail to match the
facts
A vast literature has focused on the questions of smoking bans. Since the earlier
stages, it was mostly aimed at estimating the potential impact on the profit of firms,
and used by advocates and opponents to the laws. Besides, some authors have tried
to add a theoretical structure to these results. Before setting up the model, I briefly
summarize the three main explanations to the empirical puzzles to be found in the
literature, and why I consider they may be insufficient to explain those results.
2.1.1 The market reflects the preferences of buyers
A simple economic statement on the subject of smoking bans may be the follow-
ing: if individuals and restaurant owners are rational utility maximizers, there is no
rationale for introducing a law to decides of what the best choice is for individuals.
Second-hand smoking is a well-known phenomenon, and consumers who go to a
restaurant that allows smoking are informed of the risk they are taking. Even em-
ployees that work in a smoking environment are in fact making an optimal choice:
they know the risk they are taking and they are rewarded for this. This point is raised
by Boyes and Marlow (1996), in their paper on the public demand for smoking
bans. They conclude that Coase’s theorem can be applied to property rights on the
air quality in restaurants. The Coase Theorem predicts that private markets internal-
ize negative externalities when there are zero transaction costs and property rights
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are clearly assigned to all resources. The authors argue that, as the air space within
privately-owned premises is also private, owners of these premises are owners of
the air space and are free to allocate it between two distinct demanders: smokers
and nonsmokers. Property rights are thus clearly assigned. The authors assume that
negotiation between smokers and nonsmokers occurs at no cost via the owners of
the private businesses. Hence, smoking bans shift ownership of the airspace away
from owners of firms to nonsmokers. By voting a law, the government allocates air
space at zero price to nonsmokers. Smokers transfer income to nonsmokers without
being compensated. Therefore, a smoking ban law can be seen as a way for the ma-
jority to get themselves an income transfer from the minority. As the laissez faire
is expected to maximize the profit, the ban should of course decrease it. Yet, this is
not what can be observed.
Among others, positive or non significant impact has been found by: Huang and
McCusker (2002) (in El Paso, Texas), Bartosh and Pope (2002) (in Massachusetts),
Glantz and Smith (1994) (15 communities in California and Colorado), Sciacca
and Ratliff (1998) (in Flagstaff, Arizona), Huang et al. (1995) (in West Lake Hills,
Texas). Dunham and Marlow (2000) and Dunham and Marlow (2003) put those
results into perspective, mostly because they do not take into account distributional
effects.3 This is mostly because it mixes smoking bans and other regulations. Those
results are consistent with the model I develop, as they allow emphasizing the dif-
3Moreover, the authors analyze a survey carried out on 600 owners of restaurants randomly cho-
sen in the US. They conclude that an important percentage of owners (39%) predicted a decrease
in their revenues if a ”smoking law” was voted. They argue that the predictions of the owners of
restaurants not affected by a smoking regulation did not differ from those of the owners of restau-
rants affected by the law. A first problem is that they consider as Law States not only those that
voted a 100% smoking ban, but also those who voted laws of regulation (for instance, laws asking
the restaurants to have at least some percentage of their seating in nonsmoking zones) or partial
smoking bans. Indeed, while looking more carefully at the 32 States defined as Law States, only 3
of them had a 100% smoking ban on bars and restaurants at the time the study was published. In
fact, the only necessary condition to be considered as a Law State is to have voted laws allowing or
requiring nonsmoking sections in restaurants. Moreover, the question that has been asked refers to
expected variation of profit if a smoking law is voted, without defining precisely what kind of ban
or restriction is considered, allowing the owners to implicitly interpret this regarding the kind of law
they face or fear to face.
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ferences between total and partial smoking bans. Another approach has been used
by Alamar and Glantz (2004). They tested the impact of a 100% smoking law in
two US States (Utah and California). They conclude that there was a slightly pos-
itive effect on the value of restaurants. This does not necessarily means that sales
increased, because costs are lower when restaurants are nonsmoking. Adams and
Cotti (2007), in a difference in differences analysis for the entire USA, found no
significant impact on employment in restaurants.
Looking again at the survey presented by Dunham and Marlow (2000), we learn
that only a very small number of restaurants ban smoking in the US (100% of their
seating dedicated to nonsmoking consumers) in States where no smoking ban law
has been voted. In the UK, Adda et al. (2009) find that more than 95% of the pubs
allowed smoking before the ban. In France, the website of the city of Paris (paris.fr)
counted slightly more than 100 restaurants or bars offering a hermetic nonsmok-
ing environment (the city counted 12 699 restaurants and bars in 2005) the day
before the ban. The existing websites trying to reference nonsmoking restaurants
in Brussels (rookvrij.be, thinkabout.be) counted slightly more than 20 nonsmoking
restaurants or bars in the city (among the more than 3000 referenced by the Belgian
institute of statistics) before the smoking ban. The supply of nonsmoking restau-
rant seats was thus scarce, even if those countries all appear to have a majority of
nonsmokers in the adult population.4
2.1.2 Restaurants and bars have different cultures
Two papers undertake separate analysis for bars and restaurants: Phelps (2006) and
Adams and Cotti (2007). Both find no significant effect of a ban in restaurants,
and a negative effect of a ban in bars. The variable they study is employment in
4Among recent surveys for those countries: 20,9% of US adults are cigarette smokers (NHIS,
2005), 22% in the UK (NHS, 2007), 27% in Belgium (CRIOC, 2004) and 27% in France (INSEE,
2001)
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the considered sector. (Adams and Cotti , 2007, p.5) justify to undertake a separate
analysis of bars and restaurants by the idea that ‘Smoking seems to be part of the
bar culture and not necessarily part of the restaurant culture’. Dunham and Marlow
(2000) argue that it is more difficult to separate smokers and nonsmokers in bars,
and that nonsmokers have a lower preference for nonsmoking environment in bars.
This difference cannot be ignored, but it does not allow to understand why so
few restaurants ban smoking without a ban and why the support increases after the
ban. Moreover the ‘cultural’ argument may be the consequence of the bans and not
its cause, as bans have been voted for trains, planes, and many other public places
where smoking was part of the ‘culture’. Indeed, as emphasized by Adams and Cotti
(2007), bars and restaurants are differently affected by bans, but the number of bans
is also different. Many bans in bars are implemented when a ban is already enforced
in restaurants. And many jurisdictions still ban smoking only in restaurants.
2.1.3 Consumers do not know their preferences
Finally, there is potentially a ‘behavioral’ explanation. The main result of the empir-
ical literature on the perception of bans is that the support for smoking bans in the
population, and particularly among smokers, increases after the smoking ban has
been voted. This result is validated both in cross section and time series analysis.
For instance, Fong et al. (2006) carry out a survey in Ireland showing that ‘support
for total bans among Irish smokers increased in all venues’, Gilpin et al. (2004)
discussing the smoking bans in California, conclude that ‘a strong, comprehensive
tobacco programme such as California’s can influence population norms, includ-
ing those of smokers’. Comparing the answers of smokers in four countries (USA,
Canada, UK and Australia), Borland et al. (2006) show that ‘support for bans is re-
lated to the presence of bans’ and that ‘smokers adjust and both accept and comply
with smoke-free laws’. Similarly, the survey of Gallus et al. (2006) in Italy stated
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‘Once smoke-free policy were introduced support for them in the public opinion
tended to increase’. This can go together with the general idea that the preferences
for ‘sin goods’ can be time inconsistent Gruber and Kószegi (2004)
This behavioral explanation seems unable to explain the whole phenomenon. In
the US, many bans have been enacted at the community level. And it does not ap-
pear that the surrounding communities experienced a decentralized change towards
nonsmoking restaurants. If the experience of nonsmoking places changes the utility
functions, one should expect a contagion effect at the borders of countries with a
smoking ban. This did not happen. Moreover, Phelps (2006) shows that a ban is
more likely to increase the profit of a restaurant if the community is the first one
to enact it than if it is surrounded by other nonsmoking communities. This goes
exactly the opposite way as learning our own preferences.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Setup
The economy is composed of two groups: customers and sellers.
The sellers are a continuum of restaurants of mass 1 and a continuum of bars of
mass 1. The sellers endogenously choose whether to allow smoking or not. Sellers
also individually set a price. Production costs are equal to zero, and the smoking
policy can be chosen at no cost.5
Among the customers, there is a mass 1 of drinkers, a mass 1 of eaters and a
mass 2λ of good timers. Drinkers look for a bar, eaters look for a restaurant, and
good timers have only decided to go out, either to a bar or to a restaurant. Hence, λ
represents the level of substitutability between bars and restaurants. Consumers go
out in groups: there is a share α of nonsmokers, µ of mixed groups and 1−µ−α
5In fact, a restaurant does not set a ‘single price’, but one can interpret this price as a profit
margin.
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of smokers in the population, with α > 1−µ−α (more nonsmokers than smokers).
I assume those proportions are the same for all types of customers.6
When the smoking policy of the premises coincides with the preferences of the
customer, the surplus of the matching is V , when it does not, the surplus is v < V .
The surplus is received by the buyer if she accepts the price set by the seller. The
outside option is set to r ∈ (0,v). A group of customer can buy either 0 or exactly 1
unit of either good. Parameters α,µ,V,v and r are common knowledge. The search
costs are modeled by a discount factor δ tending towards 1.7 The stages of the game
are the following:
1. Sellers simultaneously choose their smoking policy and price ;
2. Customers learn the share γR and γB of nonsmoking restaurants and bars, and
the distribution of prices in each category ;
3. Each group of customers is randomly matched with a seller. He observes the
price and the chosen category of the seller he is matched with. Each group
decides whether to Accept the offer, Leave the market and receive the outside
option r or to Search for another seller. The decision rules within the groups
are presented in the next subsection. If a group searches, he is randomly
matched with another seller, but her payoffs are discounted with a parameter
δ tending towards 1. There is no limit for search, but the cumulated discount
factor decreases to δ s after s searches. A group of drinkers is matched only
with bars, a group of eaters is matched only with restaurants, a group of good
timers first chooses whether to go to a bar or a restaurant, and then stays in
the chosen category.
6The objective is to isolate the market effect that is not explained by an intrinsic difference of
‘culture’. However, it is easy to change this and it does not affect the reasoning.
7In the first chapter, I show how increasing the discount factor does not affect the main equilibria.
The decentralized equilibrium 55
2.2.2 Decision rules
For a group to accept an offer, there must be an agreement on the chosen bar or
restaurant. An homogenous group (smokers or nonsmokers) accepts an offer if and
only if the participation constraint (utility of accepting is higher than the outside
option) and the incentive compatibility (the expected utility of search is lower than
the utility of accepting) of all its members are met. As they share the same utility
function, the reasoning is the same as for an individual.
Within mixed groups, a decision rule must be defined. One can consider two
polar cases:
An easygoing group accepts an offer if all the participation constraints of its
members are met and if searching is not - in expectation and given the decision rule
- Pareto Improving.
A confrontational group accepts an offer if both the participation constraints
and the incentive compatibility of all its members are met.
As will be made clear below, these decision rules lead, in practice, to equivalent
outcomes.
Regarding mixed groups of good timers, I assume that the groups choose the cat-
egory between restaurants and bars that maximizes the probability of accepting an
offer. If both probabilities are equal, the tie-breaking rule is to choose each category
with probability 12 .
2.3 The decentralized equilibrium
I first derive two lemmas, similar in their intuition to Lemma 1 and 2 of the first
chapter. In this decentralized market, the potential equilibria for bars and restau-
rants are similar, as the problem is symmetric. This does not imply that the realized
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equilibria are equivalent. I assume there is a majority of nonsmokers. The oppo-
site can also be true and leads to symmetric conclusions. To understand the first
lemma, one has to remember that, as the utility is nonstranferable within group, it is
necessary to meet all participation constraints of the members of the groups for the
participation constraint of the group to be met.
Lemma 6 There are only two possible prices in a Nash Equilibrium: p=V−r and
p = v− r
Sketch of the Proof. The formal proof is similar to the proof of lemma 1 of
chapter 1. Due to the existence of a continuum of sellers and the presence of search
costs, the equilibrium prices always converge towards the participation constraints
of either type of consumers. There are only two participation constraints: for a good
match (p = V − r) or for a mismatch (p = v− r). As utility is nontransferable, the
participation constraint of a mixed group is also the participation constraint of a
mismatch, regardless of the decision rule. Hence, it is a best response for any seller
to slightly increase the price unless it is exactly v− r or V − r.
The incentive for a seller to set the low price is higher in the presence of mixed
groups. Specializing in the majority type - nonsmokers - can imply attracting a
minority of groups, as mixed groups only accept offers when the price meets both
participation constraints.
Lemma 7 If α(V −r)< v−r, restaurants and bars play a pure strategy. Hence, all
restaurants either allow or ban smoking, and all bars either allow or ban smoking
Proof. The formal proof is similar to the proof of lemma 2 of chapter 1, except
for the impact of mixed groups. If smoking is allowed on all premises, the first
seller to ban smoking can set a high price, but specializes only in the nonsmoking
groups. Indeed, there exists a continuum of sellers and positive search costs, hence
a single seller cannot make a customer search for him. Assume all restaurants allow
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smoking. The first one to ban smoking can either keep the same price, and reduce its
demand by losing all smoking groups, or increase the price until it is exactly p=V−
r, but loose both the smoking and the mixed groups. Again, this is independent of
the decision rule, as the high price never allows meeting the participation constraint
of both types of consumers. Hence, γR ∈ {0,1} and γB ∈ {0,1}
This implies that the social norm is not necessarily the same in bars and restau-
rants. In the two decision rules proposed for mixed groups, the probability to go
either to a bar or a restaurant would be the same (P = 1), and all the buyers accept
an offer. Hence, we can observe different "cultures", not based on different prefer-
ences, but on different beliefs.8 This case is also close to the idea that the failure
of the market to provide a nonsmoking environment can be the result of a coordi-
nation failure, as put forward by (Adams and Cotti , 2007, p.6). However, in the
equilibrium I present here, bars and restaurants never take a wrong decision: they
are indifferent between both pure strategy equilibria. The difference in welfare only
comes from the share of mismatched groups. Hence, if the beliefs in the population
are such that bars and restaurants are smoking premises, it is a best response for all
owners to keep allowing smoking unless they can increase their profit by increasing
their price and losing any demand from smoking and mixed groups.
The expected profit pi for all sellers is identical and is:
pi = (1+λ )(v− r)
Lemma 8 If α(V − r) > v− r, the only Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium, Asym-
metric Supply (some surplus left to the minority) - ASmin - is such that a share
γ∗ = γ∗R = γ∗B ∈ (0,1) of bars and restaurants ban smoking while the reminder allow
it. The nonsmoking premises set high price p = V − r, while the smoking premises
set low price p = v− r.
8However, an equilibrium with different ‘cultures’ is not Coalition Proof unless the mass of "good
timers" is exactly zero.
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Sketch of the Proof. A formal proof of the uniqueness of this equilibrium is
given in appendix 2.6.1. The concept of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium ensures
that a self-enforcing deviation of a share of sellers is not enough to make the equi-
librium disappear. As the switching cost is zero, sellers must be indifferent in ex-
pectation between both policies. A seller allowing smoking attracts: (i) nonsmoking
groups matched with him (ii) mixed groups matched with him (iii) smoking groups
matched with him (iv) smoking groups initially matched with nonsmoking premises
and searching for a good match. Hence, the total profit of a smoking bar or restau-
rant is:
pis = (1+λ )[α+µ+
1−α−µ
1− γ ](v− r) (2.1)
Sellers that ban smoking only attract nonsmoking groups, as they do not meet any
other participation constraint and as no group has an incentive to search for them.
Hence, their profit is:
pins = (1+λ )α(V − r) (2.2)
The share of nonsmoking premises is obtained by equating those two profit lev-
els, since the profit on nonsmoking premises is independent of γ and the profit of
smoking premises is decreasing in γ . Solving pis = pins yields:
γ∗ = 1− (1−α−µ)(v− r)
α(V − r)− (α+µ)(v− r)
γ∗ =
α(V − r)− (v− r)
α(V − v)−µ(v− r) (2.3)
Nonsmoking premises are attended only by nonsmokers, while smoking premises
attract all groups of consumers. Groups of smokers search until they find smok-
ing premises. Mixed groups matched with nonsmoking premises leave the market
without buying. Mixed groups matched with smoking premises accept the offer,
while nonsmoking groups accept any offer without search. The share of non-
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smoking premises is increasing in the share of nonsmoking groups, and decreas-
ing in the share of all other groups. Specifically, close to the limit of inequality
α(V − r) < v− r, the share of nonsmoking premises γ is expected to be very low.
Mixed groups initially matched with nonsmoking premises never accept the offer,
but do not search either: they leave the market without buying. This decision is,
again, independent of the decision rule within the group. As both smoking and non-
smoking premises offer the same utility for nonsmokers, the decision is never con-
frontational.
Define the surplus of a mixed group by v˜, with v < v˜ < V .9 The total surplus
generated by each matching is the following:
Average surplus of the matching Average surplus for the customers
Smokers V V − (v− r)
Nonsmokers γV +(1− γ)v r
Mixed γr+(1− γ)v˜ γr+(1− γ)(v˜− (v− r))
Hence, the total gains of trade (as compared to everyone taking the outside op-
tion) are
W = α(γV +(1− γ)v)+µ(γr+(1− γ)v˜)+(1−α−µ)V (2.4)
Lemma 9 Even when it is an equilibrium, providing diversity is always dominated
in terms of total welfare. Depending on the share of mixed groups, the social opti-
mum in the presence of a positive mass of smoking premises is either only smoking
premises, or an arbitrarily small share of nonsmoking premises.
Proof. The share of nonsmoking premises has an ambiguous effect in terms of total
welfare. Indeed, on the one hand it increases the share of nonsmoking groups with
9The size of the group does not influence our results. If one consider groups of two people, mixed
groups are composed of one smoker and one nonsmoker, and therefore v˜ = V+v2 .
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a good match, but it also increases the share of mixed groups leaving the market
without buying anything. Hence, the first best share of nonsmoking premises, when
γ < 1,10 can be either γ tending towards 1 or γ = 0, depending on whether the gain
for nonsmokers is higher than the loss for mixed groups, i.e. the solution to the
maximization of equation (2.4) is to choose γ tending towards 1 iff
α(V − v)> µ(v˜− r) (2.5)
This implies that if a social planner, instead of a smoking ban, can define an op-
timal share of licenses for premises allowing smoking, this would be either exactly
111 or a number arbitrarily small but not exactly zero. However, as discussed in
the next section, the outcome where all the premises allow smoking is always dom-
inated by a smoking ban in total welfare. Hence, when inequality (2.5) does not
hold, the ‘best’ outcome allowing smoking bans is to allow smoking everywhere,
and the total gains from trade are lower than in the presence of a smoking ban.
Proposition 5 In a decentralized equilibrium, unless all restaurants and bars ban
smoking, nonsmoking premises are attended only by nonsmokers, while smokers
and mixed groups attend smoking premises.
Proof. When all premises ban smoking, from lemma 2, the price is low enough, and
all groups of consumers accept the offer of nonsmoking bars and restaurants. When
all premises allow smoking, all groups go to smoking restaurants. In the mixed
equilibrium defined in lemma 3, nonsmokers go to nonsmoking premises, mixed
groups either go to smoking premises or leave the market, and smokers only go to
smoking premises.
10This condition ensures that smokers continue to search.
11Implying a negative price for the licenses, since the share of smoking premises is higher than
the equilibrium one.
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Hence, a majority of nonsmokers is absolutely compatible with a minority of
nonsmoking premises. First, because if the beliefs are such that smoking is allowed
everywhere, it can be a best response for all owners to allow smoking. Second,
because even if it is not the case, the nonsmoking premises will be a niche market,
while a diversified population including smokers and nonsmokers, and even some
groups composed only by nonsmokers, go to smoking premises.
To repeat, this is totally unrelated to matters of quality, ‘culture’ or willingness
to go out. Nonsmoking premises appear to be preferred only by very few people, not
because they provide lower utility, but because of the price structure in equilibrium.
2.4 On the economic impact of smoking bans in bars
and restaurant: three scenarii
2.4.1 A smoking ban everywhere
A smoking ban everywhere gives an incentive to nonsmoking premises to attract
all types of consumers. It is easy to show12 that the only Coalition Proof Nash
Equilibrium is γ = 1 and p = v− r. Hence, there is a positive effect of the ban on
the number of good matches for nonsmokers and a negative effect on the number of
good matches for smokers.
On top of that there is the mixed group effect. If the decentralized market out-
come is to provide both smoking and nonsmoking premises, the mixed groups
matched with nonsmoking premises leave the market without buying. In presence
of the smoking ban, they accept any offer since it meets all the participation con-
straints.
12The intuition is similar to the proof of lemma 3 in the first chapter.
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Lemma 10 A smoking ban on both bars and restaurants decreases aggregate wel-
fare iff (i) the market provides both smoking and nonsmoking premises in equilib-
rium (ii) the welfare loss from mismatched smokers outweighs the gains from good
matches of nonsmokers and mixed groups not leaving the market.
Proof. If the market only provides nonsmoking premises, it is obvious that the ban
has no impact. If the market only provides smoking premises, the ban is welfare
improving as all consumers are still matched, but a largest share benefits from a
good match. If the market provides diversity, a ban is welfare improving iff the
gains derived from the matches of nonsmokers and the mixed groups is higher then
the losses from smokers
α(γV +(1− γ)v)+µ(γr+(1− γ)v˜)+(1−α−µ)V < αV +µ v˜+(1−α−µ)v
This is equivalent to:
α(1− γ)(V − v)+µγ(v˜− r)> (1−α−µ)(V − v) (2.6)
A sufficient condition for inequality (2.6) to hold is:
µ(v˜− r)> (1−α−µ)(V − v) (2.7)
Indeed, we already know that when inequality (2.5) does not hold, the socially
optimal share of smoking premises is 1 when it is not exactly zero. The total welfare
in presence of a smoking ban is always higher than when all the premises allow
smoking (since the share of nonsmokers is higher than the share of smokers). If
inequality (2.5) holds, the smoking ban is beneficial if the total welfare with the
ban is higher than with almost zero smoking premises. This simplifies to inequality
(2.7): the smoking ban allows mixed groups to get a good match at the cost of the
smokers having a mismatch.
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Inequality (2.7) is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a smoking ban to
be welfare improving. Indeed, in equation (2.6), the sufficient and necessary con-
dition, γ is endogenously determined by α,V,v,r and µ . On the one hand, a high
equilibrium value of γ implies that many nonsmokers have a good match initially,
and that the smoking ban may be detrimental. However, taking into account the
mixed groups has exactly the opposite effect. Those groups benefit more from the
smoking ban when the market was already providing nonsmoking environment. In-
deed, the nonsmoking premises in an equilibrium with product diversity exclude
mixed groups from the market. As no one leaves the market without buying in the
presence of a smoking ban, this policy is good for mixed groups in the cases where
the market was already providing a large share of nonsmoking environments.
Lemma 11 A smoking ban on both bars and restaurants (weakly) decreases the
profit of firms. In presence of product diversity, the negative impact on profit is
negatively correlated with the share of nonsmoking premises in the decentralized
equilibrium.
Proof. The profit of the sellers either decreases or remains constant. In an equilib-
rium with γ ∈ (0,1), it decreases from pi = (1+λ )α(V − r) to pi ′ = (1+λ )(v− r).
Therefore, the smoking ban hurts businesses, but the higher the initial share of non-
smoking premises, the higher the profit losses. Indeed, as γ∗ = α(V−r)−(v−r)α(V−v)−µ(v−r) , the
numerator decreases when pi is close to pi ′, and is exactly 0 when pi = pi ′. If the
equilibrium share of nonsmoking premises is close to zero, the profit loss due to the
smoking ban is also close to zero. In an equilibrium where γ ∈ {0,1}, the ban does
not affect profit.
This result can seem counter intuitive: if the market outcome provides a large
share of nonsmoking premises, then a ban has a high negative impact on profits. But
this is explained by the fact that the share of nonsmoking premises in equilibrium
reflects the extra profit sellers make by specializing only in this type of consumers,
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and extracting their entire surplus. In presence of a smoking ban, this extra surplus
goes back to the customers, thereby decreasing the profit of sellers.
Proposition 6 The two policies that maximize total welfare are either an arbitrarily
small share of licenses for smoking premises, or a total smoking ban. One of the
two policies is always dominating the market equilibrium in terms of total surplus,
but none is Pareto improving.
Proof. By lemma 9, 10 and 11. The welfare maximizing policy is either almost
no smoking premises, or a full smoking ban. However, a smoking ban decreases
both the welfare of smokers and the surplus of sellers, while a policy of licenses
decreases the surplus of mixed groups.
The existence of mixed groups makes the world more complex than when de-
cision are taken individually. It is impossible to define Pareto improving policies.
Therefore, even if it is beneficial in terms of total welfare, any regulation is a matter
of political choices, not of market efficiency.
2.4.2 A smoking ban in restaurants only
a. Baseline
Assume the ban does not apply to bars. Restaurants are all nonsmoking and set
price p = v− r.
Assume first that bars do not change their policy, i.e. stay in ASmin. I conclude
this subsection by checking under which conditions ASmin is still an equilibrium.
Lemma 12 If a smoking ban applies to restaurants only, and if some bars still allow
smoking then a smoking ban has an ambiguous effect on the profit of restaurants
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Proof. In this case, substitution effects have to be taken into account. Among the
good timers, consumers who have the choice, all nonsmoking groups choose restau-
rants. Under any of the decision rules, mixed groups do the same, they buy and re-
ceive expected surplus above the reservation utility. All the smokers go to bars. This
means that the new profit for restaurants is given by
pi = (1+(α+µ)2λ )(v− r)> (1+λ )(v− r)
The economic impact of the smoking ban on the profit of a restaurant can be ei-
ther positive or negative. On the one hand, restaurants benefit from an increase in the
number of consumers. On the other hand, they suffer from a decrease in price and
there is no longer any search. Hence, if α , µ and λ are sufficiently large, a smoking
ban in restaurants can increase the profit of restaurants, due to substitutability. This
can be put in parallel with the ‘border’ effect found by Phelps (2006). If there is
some substitutability between communities, then the first community to ban smok-
ing can enjoy increased profits.
Lemma 13 If a smoking ban applies to restaurants only, and if some bars still allow
smoking then a smoking ban decreases the profit of bars and increases the share of
bars that allow smoking
Proof. The profit of nonsmoking bars, and of all the bars as expected profit is the
same, decreases due to the desertion of the good timers, of both nonsmoking and
mixed groups,
pi = α(V − r)< α(1+λ )(V − r)
The demand for smoking bars is now
D = α+µ+(1+2λ )(
1−α−µ
1− γ )
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Hence, the share of smoking bars is γ∗ is higher than before the ban, as it is the
solution to:
α(V − r) = [α+µ+(1+2λ )(1−α−µ
1− γ )](v− r)
⇔ γ = 1− (1+2λ )(1−α−µ)(v− r)
α(V − v)−µ(v− r)
Hence, if ASmin is still a Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium, the smoking ban in
restaurants implies that the profit of bars decreases, and that the share of smoking
bars increases.
However, it is not obvious that ASmin is still a Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium.
The condition to be in ASmin has changed because (i) The profit in equilibrium has
decreased (ii) the share of smokers in the demand has increased. A bar that decides
individually to set price p = v− r has no influence on the decision of good timers
from nonsmoking or mixed groups, who decide to go to restaurant anyway.
Condition 3 Therefore, the condition to have product diversity is:
α(V − r)> (1+2λ (1−α−µ))(v− r)
Proposition 7 If condition 1 is true i.e. if some but not all bars allow smoking after
a smoking ban in restaurants, then this smoking ban (i) has an ambiguous impact on
the profit of restaurants (ii) has a negative impact on the profit of bars (iii) increases
the share of bars that allow smoking
Proof. Using lemma 12 and 13 and condition 1.
Hence, a smoking ban has two possible outcomes:
1. The share of smoking bars increases and their profit decreases
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2. There is a norm (either all bars ban smoking or allow smoking) and profit
decreases
In the latter case, if bars all allow smoking, the profit is given by
pi = (1+2(1−α−µ)λ )(v− r)
which is even smaller than before. If all bars ban smoking, then the profit of restau-
rants also changes, and both firms get the same profit as in the case where the ban
affected both bars and restaurants.
b. A smoking ban in restaurants only, and then a smoking ban in bars
Consider now the short run impact of a smoking ban on bars, when a smoking ban
already applies to restaurants. If all consumers are flexible, this brings us back to
the equilibrium where a ban applies to both types of firms. But if one assumes that
in the short run consumption behaviors presents some rigidity, i.e. that good timers
cannot change of subsets, the picture is different.
Indeed, one can then expect the following profits respectively for bars and restau-
rants.
piR = (1+2(α+µ)λ )(v− r)
piB = (1+2(1−α−µ)λ )(v− r)
This means that the short run effect of a smoking ban for bars, when they are
specialized in smoking consumers, can be quite negative, while it does not affect
restaurants. This implies that a policy that aims to protect the bar industry by tem-
porarily exempting them from the smoking ban for some time can have the exact
opposite effect. A legislator who decides to take such a decision must be convinced
that smoking will be allowed in bars forever, or accept to see a large decrease in
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profit for bars, at least in the short term.13
2.5 Conclusion
This model aims to explain how group and substitution effects can affect the effec-
tive and the desirable level of horizontal diversity of premises. Using the example
of smoking bans in bars and restaurants I show that, even when product diversity
exists in practice, it is not always desirable. Regardless of the market equilibrium,
the premises that specialize in what the majority of people prefer are always a niche
market. Mixed groups always choose to go to the places preferred by the minority
of people. This decision is independent of the potential existence of conflicts within
the group. The only necessary condition for consumption of a group to occur is that
the participation constraints of all the members of the group must be satisfied.
The impact of smoking bans on aggregate welfare is however ambiguous. Triv-
ially, it always decreases the surplus derived from the matching of smokers. When a
large share of premises ban smoking in the decentralized equilibrium, many mixed
groups never buy, and a smoking ban can be beneficial for them. However, it de-
creases the surplus from smokers without increasing the share of nonsmokers with
a good match very much. When few premises ban smoking, then a smoking ban
increases the surplus from the matching of nonsmokers, but does not increase the
share of mixed groups that stay in the market very much.
A complete smoking ban, affecting both bars and restaurants, always (weakly)
decreases the profit of sellers. However, this profit loss can be very low when the de-
centralized market provides only few nonsmoking premises. Moreover, if a smoking
ban is enacted in restaurants and not in bars, the profit of the former may increase
while the profit of the latter always decreases. As a consequence, the share of smok-
13A political economy implication of this is that bars may lobby in favor of such an exemption,
because it will be more difficult for a legislator to ban smoking afterwards.
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ers in bars increases, which may convince bar owners that a smoking ban in a second
period may hurt them even more, specifically if consumers have habits and ‘stick’
to the same establishments for more than one period.
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2.6 Technical Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Lemma 8
If α(V − r)> v− r, the only Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium is such
that a share γ∗ = γ∗R = γ∗B of bars and restaurants ban smoking while the
reminder allow it. The nonsmoking premises set high price p′ =V − r,
while the smoking premises set low price p = v− r. Nonsmoking
premises are attended only by nonsmokers, while smoking premises at-
tract all groups of consumers. Groups of smokers search until they find
smoking premises. Mixed groups matched with nonsmoking premises
leave the market without buying. Mixed groups matched with smoking
premises accept the offer, while nonsmoking groups accept any offer
without search.
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• γ∗R = 0 or γ∗B = 0 and price p = v− r is not a Nash Equilibrium. A seller
deciding to ban smoking and setting price V − r increases its profit, as α(V −
r)> v− r
• γ∗R = 1 or γ∗B = 1 and price p = v− r can be a Nash Equilibrium. A seller
deciding to allow smoking and setting price V − r increases its profit only if
(1−α−µ)(V − r)> (v− r). This is not necessarily the case, as α > 1−α−
µ . However, it is not Coalition-Proof. Indeed, if a sub-coalition of sellers of
strictly positive mass decides to allow smoking and set a price v− r, the best
response of owners of nonsmoking premises is to increase the price until it is
exactly V − r. Hence, the deviation is self-enforcing, as there exists coalitions
sufficiently large, such that it is a best response for its member not to increase
the price (not to lose nonsmokers and mixed groups).
• γ∗R = 0 or γ∗B = 0 and price p′=V−r is not an equilibrium, as a seller that bans
smoking and set price p′ = V − r increases its profit pi = (1+λ )α(V − r) >
(1+λ )(1−α−µ)(V − r)
• γ∗R = 1 or γ∗B = 1 and price p′ =V − r can be a Nash Equilibrium. However, it
is not Coalition-Proof. Indeed, if a sub-coalition of sellers of strictly positive
mass decides to allow smoking and set a price v− r, there exist coalitions
sufficiently large, such that it is a best response for its member not to increase
the price (not to lose nonsmokers and mixed groups).
γ∗R ∈ (0,1) and γ∗B ∈ (0,1) are the only remaining candidates. Now, we need to
show that any other possibility than γ∗ = γ∗R = γ∗B =
α(V−r)−(v−r)
α(V−v)−µ(v−r) and pns =V − r,
ps = v− r is not a coalition proof Nash Equilibrium.
• pns = ps = v− r is not Coalition-Proof, as it yields a profit lower than (1+
λ )α(V − r)
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• ps =V−r is not Coalition-Proof, as it yields a profit lower than (1+λ )α(V−
r)
• For any γ∗ 6= α(V−r)−(v−r)α(V−v)−µ(v−r) , one of the two category of sellers (smoking or
nonsmoking) has a higher profit than the other. Hence, it is not an equilibrium.
Part II
An essay in Urban Transportation
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Chapter 3
Modal Choice and Optimal
Congestion
(joint with Quentin David)
The cost of congestion is an increasingly important issue in urban areas. For
instance, Duranton and Turner (2011) estimate that a typical American household
spends 161 person-minutes in a car every day. Goodwin (2004) expected the annual
cost of congestion in the UK to reach 30 billion £ in 2010. De Palma and Lindsey
(2011) report congestion costs between 0.5 and 1.5 % of GDP in urban areas. Most
of the congestion is due to the use of private cars. On the one hand, cars generate
both congestion - on other cars and on public transportation - and pollution. On
the other hand, cars are necessary for the economy. Unfortunately, screening com-
muters to reach the optimal share of cars is a complex policy challenge. This is why
policies must identify tools that affect peoples’ behavior and improve efficiency.
In practice, the most widely-used policies addressing traffic issues are taxation,1
subsidies and traffic separation.2
1See de Palma and Lindsey (2011) for a survey of the different methods and impacts of congestion
tolls.
2For instance through the use of exclusive lanes for public transportation. See Cain et al. (2006)
and Echeverry et al. (2005) for larger discussion of the case of Bogota’s Transmilenio and its appli-
cation to other countries.
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In this paper, we build a theoretical model in which heterogeneous commuters
decide simultaneously whether to use a private car or public transportation. Car
users generate congestion on all the commuters and users of public transportation
enjoy a positive network externality.3 We do not specifically model pollution costs,
as this externality affects all commuters regardless of their modal choice, and there-
fore does not affect this decision. In practice, considering the impact of pollution
would lower the socially optimal share of car users obtained with our model.
First, we show that the market outcome never maximizes aggregate welfare. This
is a classic result, in presence of externalities. Second, we explain how ex-ante simi-
lar cities might end up with very different modal shifts. This is a problem of coordi-
nation when a large share of commuters have similar preferences. In the presence of
such multiple equilibria, the one involving the highest share of public transportation
always Pareto dominates all the others. Therefore, the market presents two types
of inefficiencies. The first one is at the margin: the market provides a too large
share of car users in any decentralized equilibrium. The second is more substantial:
coordination failures may lead to the presence of inefficient equilibria.
We study two policies: taxation (which, in our discrete choice setup is equivalent
to a fare subsidy) and traffic separation. Both can be used to enforce coordination.
We show that the main problem of taxation is when the number of car users is small.
Shrinking the tax base can be very detrimental for the remaining car users. The main
problem of traffic separation is when the increase in congestion costs outweighs the
benefits resulting from the decrease of the share of car users. This happens when the
share of car users is high in equilibrium. In practice, a social planner considering
marginal changes in commuting patterns should focus on taxation, while a social
planner interested in more substantial changes should focus on traffic separation.
The question of optimal congestion has been addressed by many scholars from
different fields. Among economists, it is rather consensual that pigouvian taxation
3We show in Extension 5.1 how introducing discomfort externalities increases the likelihood of
ending up with multiple equilibria.
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should be the preferred way to deal with congestion problems (Beesley and Kemp,
1987, Calfee and Winston, 1998). The idea is that, given both the structure of cities
and the intrinsic preferences that many consumers have for the car, one should focus
on the best way to accommodate traffic flows and make car user pay for the marginal
external cost they produce (Anas and Small, 1998). The ‘games of congestion’ have
been largely studied in economic theory (Rosenthal, 1973) and many applied papers
deal with congestion costs and car taxation. One of the most famous results is due to
Vickrey (1963). He argues that pricing should vary at different times of the day as
to make commuters pay for the marginal cost of congestion. The question of public
transportation has often been of minor interest though some authors (e.g. Mirabel,
1999, Dobruzkes and Fourneau, 2007) addressed the so-called ‘crossed modal ex-
ternalities’ (the impact of the congestion generated by one mode of transportation
on the other one). The congestion costs have been shown to be convex both in terms
of pollution (De Vlieger et al., 2000) and in terms of perceived cost (Wardman,
2001).4
Another group of papers focuses on urban planning. It emphasizes the fact that
the structure of the city is the main driver of commuting patterns. The main idea to
improve the performance of urban transportation is to have a shift towards ‘transit-
oriented development’. Belzer and Aultier (2002) define such a development as fol-
lows: ‘mixed-use, walkable, location-efficient development that balances the need
for sufficient density to support convenient transit service with the scale of the ad-
jacent community’.5 Some economists indirectly address this dimension by con-
sidering a form of traffic separation (see Berglas et al., 1984, Arnott et al., 1992,
de Palma and Lindsey, 2002, de Palma et al. 2008). These papers propose various
4Time is valued 50% higher when spent in congestion. Hence, the cost of congestion is convex, as
congestion (i) increases travel time, and (ii) increases the marginal cost of travel time. This principle
is applied by Santos and Bhakar (2005) to assess the benefits of the congestion toll in London.
5Cervero et al. (2002, p.2), emphasize that it does ‘involve some combination of intensifying
commercial development around stations, inter-mixing land uses, layering in public amenities (e.g.,
civic spaces, landscaping), and improving the quality of walking and bicycling’. One should also
consider the book by Dittmar and Ohland (2003) that summarizes the literature and ‘good practices’
in transit oriented development.
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approaches for road pricing and tolls in the presence of alternative roads, modes of
transportation and consumer preferences. Their settings differ from our in various
dimensions, but all have in common to find a unique equilibrium and an optimal
policy, corresponding to the idea of pricing the marginal externality. In this paper,
we show that in the presence of multiple equilibria, internalizing marginal external-
ities may not be efficient. Then, some physical planning (traffic separation, in our
model) must be used as a coordination device.
The multiple equilibria come from the conjunction of congestion, positive ex-
ternalities from public transportation, and commuters’ heterogeneity. A relatively
large literature exists on the network effect of the number of transit users on the ef-
ficiency of public transportation. In a seminal contribution, Mohring (1972, p.591)
explains that ‘Transportation differs from the typical commodity price theory texts
in that travelers and shippers play a producing, not just a consuming role’. The
underlying idea is the existence of a so-called ‘dynamic network externality’. If the
demand for bus service doubles, a company is expected to double the number or
buses serving the route, at the same per capita price. Thus, the waiting time for
an individual commuting by bus decreases, which improves the efficiency of public
transportation. The combination of network externalities in public transportation
and congestion by cars is a feature of several economic models (Tabuchi, 1993,
Parry and Small, 2009). To repeat, those models focus on a unique equilibrium.
Commuters differ in their preference for the use of a private car (Beirão and Cabral,
2007, Handy et al., 2005, Jensen, 1999, Steg, 2005, Hiscock et al., 2002 and Van
Vught et al., 1996). Berhoef and Small (2004) encompass this dimension by con-
sidering heterogeneous agents in a model of pricing for car use only. Batarce and
Ivaldi (2011) test this feature in a model of modal choice applied to Santiago, Chile.
The existence of similar cities characterized by different modal shifts has al-
ready been documented in the late eighties by Pucher (1988). He observed that
‘Urban transportation and traveler behavior vary widely, even among countries with
similar per capita income, technology and urbanization’. Kenworthy and Laube
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(1999) show that the fraction of workers using transit is 6 times higher in wealthy
Asian cities compared to the US.6 They also find that the commuting time is lower
(and cheaper) where the use of public transport is higher and that the cost recov-
ery of transit increases with the share of passengers using it. Cities where transit is
intensively used appear to need a smaller share of subsidies for operating it.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an illustra-
tive example that contains the basic intuitions behind our main results. Section 3
presents the model, shows that a Nash Equilibrium always exists, gives conditions
for the existence of multiple equilibria and discusses their relative efficiency. In Sec-
tion 4, we derive the optimum of the social planner and study taxation and traffic
separation. We extend the model in section 5, addressing the possible existence of
capacity constraints and congestion within public transportation, and considering
the possibility of underground transit. We conclude in Section 6.
3.1 An illustrative example
Suppose a continuum of commuters simultaneously choose between using a car or
public transportation in order to minimize the cost associated to their modal choice.
These costs (T c and T pt) are respectively given by:
T c = t+ f
and
T pt = t+W + ε ,
where t denotes the time spent in congestion. In the benchmark case, it is identical
for both modal choices and we assume that t = 0 if less than 50% of the population
uses public transportation and t = 1 otherwise. f is the fixed cost associated with
6Similarly, Pucher and Renne (2003) computed that, in the US, public transport accounted for
less than 2% of urban travel in 2001.
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the use of a car, and is set at 1. W is a cost associated with the use of public trans-
portation that is characterized by a network externality such that if less than 50%
of the population uses public transportation, W = 2, otherwise, W = 1/2. Finally,
ε represents the value of an intrinsic preference for the use of a car, compared to
public transportation.
Consider three groups (A, B and C) of commuters of equal size (each group
represents 1/3 of the population), characterized by different levels of ε . Group A
displays strong preferences for the use of a car (ε = 2), group B is indifferent (ε = 0)
and group C prefers public transportation (ε =−2).
We define z as the equilibrium share of the population using a car and zˆ as the
beliefs over the outcome z of the game.
Depending on the expectations, the outcome of the game for an individual be-
longing to one of the groups is
if zˆ = 23 if zˆ =
1
3
TC T pt TC T pt
Group A 2 5 1 2.5
Group B 2 3 1 0.5
Group C 2 1 1 −1.5
There exist two Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategy. Group A always uses a car,
group C always uses public transportation and group B uses a car if its members
believe that the other commuters in the group will do so and public transportation
otherwise. With the same exogeneous set of parameters, one may end up either in a
world where a majority of people commute either by car or by public transportation.
However, the latter equilibrium Pareto dominates the former. We refer to these two
equilibria as the “good” and the “bad” equilibrium when z = 1/3 and z = 2/3,
respectively.
We now study the ability of two policies (taxation and traffic separation) to avoid
the “bad” equilibrium.
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Policy 1: taxation
Consider the simplest taxation scheme: a tax is levied on car users and is thrown
away. To ensure that group B uses public transportation in the presence of the tax,
its level must be set in such a way that 2+T > 3. As a consequence, we remain with
the “good” equilibrium only but, this equilibrium is no longer Pareto improving as
the group A is worse off with this tax (the cost of taxation outweighs the decrease
in congestion).
Policy 2: physical planning
Consider now a policy of traffic separation. This policy consists in separating
the traffic lanes for cars and for public transportation. Under the assumption of
a fixed number of traffic lanes, this implies an increase of the congestion for car
users and a decrease for users of public transportation. Assume that, in the presence
of congestion, the cost of congestion for cars is doubled (tc = 2 if z > 50%, tc = 0
otherwise) while it is divided by two for public transportation (t pt = 1/2 if z> 50%,
tc = 0 otherwise). The ‘bad’ equilibrium disappears again and the game becomes
if zˆ = 23 if zˆ =
1
3
TC T pt TC T pt
Group A 3 4.5 1 2.5
Group B 3 2.5 1 0.5
Group C 3 0.5 1 −1.5
.
This policy is Pareto Improving, since every commuter is better off in the equi-
librium with policy than in the “bad” equilibrium without policy.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Basic assumptions
We consider a closed city with a unit mass of commuters who have to make a dis-
crete choice between using a private car or public transportation. The use of a car
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generates congestion on the other commuters. The space is finite and it is possible
to increase neither the number of roads nor the number of the traffic lanes. The
degree of separation of public transportation from the rest of the traffic is given by
α ∈ [0,1].7 Commuters are heterogeneous as they have different intrinsic prefer-
ences for the use of a car (relative to public transportation).8 The outcome of the
game is a share z of car users, and (1− z) of public transportation users.
The utility9 of a commuter i, traveling in a private car or with public transporta-
tion, is respectively given by
Uci (α,z) =− fc− tc(α,z)+
εi
2
(3.1)
and
U pti (α,z) =−W (z)− t pt(α,z)−
εi
2
. (3.2)
The fixed cost associated with the use of the car is denoted by fc > 0.10
The functions tc(α,z) and t pt (α,z) (∈ IR+) represent the congestion faced respec-
tively by cars and public transportation. They are assumed to be equal if there is
no traffic separation between cars and public transportation, and equal to zero if
there are no users of cars (i.e. tc(0,z) = t pt (0,z) and tc(α,0) = t pt (α,0) = 0 re-
spectively). Both functions are increasing and convex in z, and a higher degree of
traffic separation (higher α) generates more congestion for cars (because there is
less space for them) and less congestion for public transportation. This last effect
7α is exogenous in this section, but we allow the social planner to choose its level in the next
section. Note also that we use a very general definition of α , one that encompasses many possibili-
ties to protect public transportation. The condition being that increasing α decreases congestion for
public transportation and increases congestion for car users. This excludes the possibility of building
an underground (which is briefly discussed in section 5).
8This preference can be negative. One can imagine various alternative ways of modelling het-
erogeneity: different valuation for time and money, different location within the city, ease of access
to the public transportation network, etc. We use the simplest formulation for the tractability of the
model.
9Utility functions are expressed in monetary terms. All components (fixed costs, congestion,
individuals’ heterogeneity and waiting time) are expressed in monetary terms.
10This is the additional cost compared to the use of public transportation, which is normalized to
0.
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is assumed to be amplified by z (that is, separation has an impact only if there is
actually a problem of congestion). Hence, we have
∂ tc
∂ z
(α,z) > 0,
∂ 2tc
∂ z2
(α,z)> 0, ∂ t
c
∂α
(α,z)> 0,
∂ 2tc
∂ z∂α
(α,z)> 0
∂ t pt
∂ z
(α,z) > 0,
∂ 2t pt
∂ z2
(α,z)> 0, ∂ t
pt
∂α
(α,z)< 0,
∂ 2t pt
∂ z∂α
(α,z)< 0.
The individual parameter, εi, is the preference for the use of a car, compared to
public transportation. It comes from a cumulative distribution function εi ∼ F (ε).
F is assumed to be continuous and differentiable over its support (−∞,+∞). This
support implies that some individuals love public transportation so much that they
would never accept not to use it (εi → −∞), while others will never use public
transportation (εi → +∞). Without loss of generality, we split εi equally between
the two utility functions.
The waiting time for public transportation is W (z) ∈ R+0 . It displays a positive
network externality for public transportation users. The idea is that, if there are
more users, the frequency of public transportation increases and the waiting time
decreases.11 For simplicity, we assume this network externality to be linear. If there
are (1− z) users of public transportation, the waiting time of each of them is given
by W (z), with
W ′(z)> 0 and W ′′(z) = 0.
Further on in the paper, it will be useful to define G(x) =F−1 (ε) ∀ε ∈ IR. Given
the assumptions over F (ε) , the support of G is x ∈ [0,1].12
Definition 8 ∆(α,z) is the additional congestion faced by car users in comparison
11An alternative interpretation: a lower price for a given quality of service.
12With G(0) = +∞, G(1) = −∞ and G(x) = εi such that there is a mass x of commuters with
ε > εi.
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to the congestion faced by public transportation, i.e.
∆(α,z) = tc(α,z)− t pt(α,z).
Using the properties of tc(α,z) and t pt(α,z), we have
Lemma 14 Properties of ∆(α,z).
(i) ∂∆(α,z)∂α > 0;
(ii) ∂∆(α,z)∂ z > 0, ∀α > 0;
(iii) Supermodularity of ∆(α,z).: the effect of separation on the differential of com-
muting time increases with congestion (with the number of car users), i.e. ∂
2∆(α,z)
∂ z∂α >
0.
Proof. (i) and (ii) are straightforward from the properties of tc(α,z) and t pt(α,z).
Property (iii), the supermodularity of ∆(α,z) is obtained using ∂
2tc(α,z)
∂ z∂α > 0 and
∂ 2t pt(α,z)
∂ z∂α < 0. The definition of ∆(α,z) = t
c(α,z)− t pt(α,z) leads to:
∂ 2∆(α,z)
∂ z∂α
=
∂ 2tc(α,z)
∂ z∂α
− ∂
2t pt(α,z)
∂ z∂α
> 0.
3.2.2 The game
The modal choice is a simultaneous game among a unit mass of commuters. It
consists in each commuter choosing the mode of transportation (either car of pub-
lic transportation) that maximizes her utility given her expectation on z. Hence,
commuter i commutes by car if Uci (α,z)>U
pt
i (α,z), i.e.
εi > fc−W (z)+ [tc(α,z)− t pt(α,z)].
If it is a best response ex post for a commuter j with ε j > εi to commute using
public transportation, it is also a best response for commuter i to do so.
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Using Definition (8), the condition for commuter i to use a car becomes
εi > fc−W (z)+∆(α,z). (3.3)
3.2.3 Decentralized Equilibria
In this section, we first show that a Nash equilibrium always exists. Second, we
derive the conditions for the presence of multiple equilibria. Third, we characterize
the most efficient one.
a. Existence
The existence of at least one Nash equilibrium is relatively easy to show. Stability
ex post comes from the fact that there always exists an equilibrium where a share of
commuters strictly prefers public transportation while the other prefers to use a car.
Proposition 8 There exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Remember F (ε) is assumed to be continuous and differentiable over its
support (−∞,+∞). This implies that there exists at least one commuter k with
taste parameter εk such that, if all commuters with parameter ε j < εk use public
transportation, and all commuters with εk < εi take the car,
G(zk) = fc−W (zk)+∆(α,zk). (3.4)
Commuter k is indifferent between the private car and public transportation. Sharing
the same beliefs, commuters with ε j < εk strictly prefer public transportation and
εk < εi strictly prefer their car. Thus, it is a Nash Equilibrium.
b. Multiplicity
The intuition behind the existence of multiple equilibria is the following. Assume
that there is a large share of commuters with similar preferences (ε) for the use of
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a car. When they believe that most of them use public transportation, it is a best re-
sponse for them to do so. This is a Nash equilibrium with a low z. If, on the contrary,
most of them believe that they will use a car, they expect public transportation not
to be efficient and, indeed, it will not be. This is also a Nash equilibrium, involving
a high z.
Proposition 9 There exist multiple equilibria if and only if there exists a solution zk
such that
∂G(zk)
∂ z
>
∂ [ fc−W (zk)+∆(α,z)]
∂ z
. (3.5)
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix 3.6.1.
For this condition to be fulfilled, the difference in the costs between the two
modes of transportation must be sufficiently low and a sufficiently high mass of
commuters must have similar preferences. Consider the particular case of unimodal
preferences: few people with polarized preferences, and a large fraction of people
with similar preferences. This is likely to lead to the presence of three equilibria,
as plotted in Figure 1 (with α = 0). There are two stable13 equilibria, one with few
users of public transportation (a share z1 of car users) and one with a large fraction
(a share z3 < z1 of car users). There is also one unstable equilibrium, z2.
c. Efficiency
Proposition 10 If there are multiple equilibria, the equilibrium involving the higher
use of public transportation Pareto dominates all the other equilibria. The Pareto
dominant equilibrium is denoted ẑ.
Proof. The formal proof is provided in Appendix 3.6.2.
Figure 1 illustrates this proposition. Define three groups of people A, B and C.
Group A uses a car in both equilibria, group C uses public transportation in both
13Those equilibria are locally stable in the sense that agents’ best-response to any small perturba-
tion to the equilibrium z would bring this share back to equilibrium.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration with multiple equilibria
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equilibria, and group B uses public transportation when z = z3 and a car otherwise.
As the cost of both public transportation and car use are lower in z3, groups A and
C are strictly better off. By revealed preferences, group B is also better off in that
equilibrium. They are better off by using a car in z3 than in z1, but they use public
transportation instead.
3.3 Social planner
In this section, we stress the possible presence of two different sources of ineffi-
ciencies. The coordination failure implies a move from one type of equilibrium to
another (e.g. z1 to z3 in the previous section). The sub-utilization of public trans-
portation implies that, at the margin, the first best equilibrium requires more users
of public transportation at any initial Nash equilibrium. This latter result is standard
in the presence of externalities.
First, we derive the first best equilibrium conditions for a social planner maxi-
mizing the aggregate utilities. We show that this social planner may miss the co-
ordination failure by focusing on local maximization. Second, we study the effect
of two policies, taxation and traffic separation at different initial Nash equilibria.
Third, we study the conditions for these policies to be Pareto improving and com-
pare their relative efficiency.
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3.3.1 The social planner’s optimum
Assume that the aim of the social planner is to maximize the sum of all commuters’
utilities, i.e.
Max
z,α
∫ 1
0
[
φUci (α,z)+(1−φ)U pti (α,z)
]
dx
st. φ = 1 if εi ≥ G(z)
= 0 otherwise
α,z ∈ [0,1]
This is equivalent to
min
z,α
∫ z
0
[ fc− tc(α,z)+ G(x)2 ]dx+
∫ 1
z
[W (z)− t pt(α,z)− G(x)
2
]dx
and the first order conditions are
G(z∗) = fc−W (z∗)+∆(α,z∗)+ ztc′z (α,z∗)+(1− z∗)[W ′(z∗)+ tPT ′z (α,z∗)] (3.6)
and
ztc′α (α,z)+(1− z)tPT ′α (α,z) = 0. (3.7)
Rearranging the terms to compare the private costs and the public benefits for
commuter i : G(z∗) = εi, equation (3.6) leads to the following condition:
W (z∗)−∆(α,z∗)− fc+G(z∗) = z∗tcz (α,z∗)+(1− z∗)
[
W ′ (z∗)+ tPTz (α,z
∗)
]
.
(3.8)
Thus, we have:
Lemma 15 In any Nash Equilibrium, the share of car users is too high. For the
share of car users to be socially optimal, there must exist public transportation
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users that strictly prefer the car.
Proof. The right-hand side of equation (3.8) corresponds to the social cost of in-
creasing the share of car users. This is clearly positive, as all negative externalities
of a car are increasing with z. On the left hand side is the individual preference
for the car of the swing commuter z∗, such that all commuters with ε < G(z∗) take
public transportation, and the other use a car. For the equality to hold, this must be
positive. This implies that the socially optimal swing commuter strictly prefers to
use a car rather than public transportation.
If the second FOC leads to an interior solution, α∗ ∈ (0,1), it becomes
z
(1− z) =−
tPTα (α∗,z)
tcα (α∗,z)
. (3.9)
The right-hand side of equation (3.9) is positive and represents a measure of the
relative efficiency of a traffic separation policy, i.e. the marginal effect of α on
the relative commuting time ratio. Defining β (α,z) = − tPTα (α∗,z)tcα (α∗,z) , it is reasonable
to believe that βα (α,z) ≥ 0 ∀ z ∈ [0,1]. Indeed, on the one hand, by increasing
the share of roads dedicated to public transportation, the incidence of congestion
on public transportation is reduced proportionally. On the other hand, the effect
on cars is likely to be different. The creation of dissociated traffic lanes for public
transportation generates bottlenecks for cars. The creation of these bottlenecks is
likely to increase congestion but at a marginally decreasing rate (by increasing the
number of bottlenecks, the impact of each one is reduced).
If the second FOC does not yield an interior solution (i.e. if βα (α,z) = 0 or
z
(1−z) 6= β (α,z) ∀α ∈ [0,1]), the social planner will choose α = 0 if z is sufficiently
high, and α = 1 if z is sufficiently small. If there is no interior solution and there
is a large share of car users, it is socially beneficial - at the margin - to allow more
space for cars. If there is a large share of public transportation users, it is socially
beneficial to fully protect public transportation from congestion.
It is important to underline that equations (3.8) and (3.9) give the conditions
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Figure 3.2: Decentralized equilibrium and social planner’s first order condition for
z∗ (α > 0)
to reach a local maximum, not necessarily a global one. As for the decentralized
equilibria, there is no reason for these optima to be unique.
Therefore, these conditions give an insight into what can be socially optimal to
solve the sub-utilization of public transportation at the margin: in any decentralized
state of the world, there are not enough users of public transportation. This is il-
lustrated in Figure (3.2) where we plot the functions on the left and the right hand
sides of equation (3.6) together with equation (3.4), the decentralized equilibrium
condition. Compared to the decentralized equilibrium, the right hand side of the
equation is associated to a higher intercept and slope, for any value of α , i.e. the
difference between the two curves is increasing in z.
A social planner could be misled when he tries to reach a maximum using equa-
tions (3.8) and (3.9). The planner may be missing a larger inefficiency: coordination
failure. Indeed, consider a Nash equilibrium that implies a high share of cars, zk,
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and assume a taxation scheme able to internalize the marginal externality. If the
social planner maximizes the aggregate utility by setting α = 0 for this value of zk,
there is a possibility that there exists another (lower) value, ẑ 6= zk, another Nash
equilibrium, with another optimal value of taxes and α > 0. In other words, a social
planner must ensure not to target a local maximum when a better, global maximum
is reachable.
3.3.2 Policy tools
In the previous sections, we showed that two different kinds of inefficiencies have to
be distinguished: coordination failure and sub-utilization of public transportation.
The first one comes from poor coordination between individuals in the presence
of multiple equilibria, when the prevailing equilibrium does not involve the best
use of public transportation. The second is due to the two considered externali-
ties (congestion and network externalities) leading to the sub-optimal use of public
transportation, whatever the prevailing equilibrium. To address the first inefficiency
properly, it is required to significantly change individuals’ behavior. To address
the second one, a central planner should affect the behavior of some marginal in-
dividuals only: those that are the most likely to use public transportation after the
implementation of new policies. In the presence of a unique equilibrium, the only
relevant conditions are given by equations (3.8) and (3.9). Otherwise, policies may
also have a role by ensuring coordination towards the most efficient equilibrium.
It is worth noting that, in our setting, a government could set a very high tax and
then remove it almost instantaneously in order to force commuters to coordinate on
the efficient equilibrium. Nevertheless, we believe that this is not realistic. The dy-
namics of switching from one equilibrium to another is a long, progressive process.
To solve this issue, we assume that setting a policy implies that the government will
keep it in place forever. This assumption may be considered ad hoc, but it is realistic
for an intervention to take effect and be credible.
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We assume that the government has two policy tools at its disposal: the taxation
of car users (T ), and the possibility to change the traffic separation between cars
and public transportation (α). Due to the discrete choice nature of the model, tax
is equivalent to a fare subsidy.14 We do not consider variations of taxation schemes
that can have differential effects among car users or time of the day.15
We assume that a taxation policy implies to levy T on every car user and that
this tax is redistributed lump-sum among all commuters.16 Therefore, every com-
muter receives a transfer zT and car users pay T . The new utility functions become
Uci (α,T,z) = − fc− tc (α,z)− (1− z)T +
εi
2
,
U pti (α,T,z) = −W (z)− t pt (α,z)+ zT −
εi
2
.
After the introduction of a taxation policy, a commuter i uses public transportation
if and only if
εi < ∆(α,z)−W (z)+T + fc
and, by proposition 8, there is always at least one Nash equilibrium. As we do not
limit the size of the tax, there always exist a T such that the only Nash equilibrium
with taxation involves a lower share of car users than in zˆ.
The traffic separation is the other available policy tool. Assume that the gov-
ernment sets a new traffic separation, α ′ : α ′ > α . The new utility functions become
Uci
(
α ′,T,z
)
= − fc− tc
(
α ′,z
)
+
εi
2
,
U pti
(
α ′,T,z
)
= −W (z)− t pt (α ′,z)− εi
2
.
14An alternative policy would be to allow the social planner to invest in lower W for a given value
of z.
15One can refer to Parry (2002) for a comparison between a single lane toll, a uniform congestion
tax across freeway lanes, a gasoline tax, and a transit fare subsidy for the reduction of congestion.
16As will be made clear below, assuming the tax is lost only marginally affects the results.
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Now, a commuter i uses public transportation if
εi < ∆(α ′,z)−W (z)+ fc.
Here, one cannot theoretically claim that the impact of traffic separation is sufficient
to keep only one equilibrium. It depends on the size of the effect of traffic separation
on the difference in commuting times. The effect of these two policies is presented
in Figure 3.3. The optimal level of traffic separation has been discussed in the
previous section. Comparing equations (3.6) and (3.4), an optimal taxation scheme
can easily be obtained. If a social planner wants to reach an optimal modal split, z∗,
it must set a level of taxation corresponding to the social marginal effect of the use
of a car, computed at the targeted optimum, z∗.
For every locally optimal modal split z∗, there exists an optimal level of taxation
T ∗ corresponding to the social marginal impact of the use of a car in z∗, this level
of taxation corresponds to the sum of the social marginal congestion for cars and
public transportation and of the social marginal opportunity cost in terms of network
externality of car users not using public transportation.
T (α,z∗) = z∗tcz (α,z
∗)+(1− z∗)[W ′ (z∗)+ tPTz (α,z∗)]
It is interesting to note that the optimal tax is increasing in z∗ (Tz(α,z∗) ≥ 0). This
means that, comparing two similar cities, if the optimal share of car users is higher
in one of the two cities, the level of taxation in that city must also be higher. This
result is due to the marginal cost of car use (both in terms of congestion and in terms
of network externalities) which is increasing in the share of car users.
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This optimal taxation is a necessary condition for the decentralized equilibrium
to be optimal. It is not a sufficient condition. Indeed, consider a city where the
decentralized equilibrium is located in z1 and the global optimum slightly to the left
of ẑ. If a social planner sets a taxation compatible with ẑ, it is very likely that the
equilibrium in the city does not end up at ẑ, but rather somewhere between z1 and ẑ,
as shown in Figure 3.4, where we duplicate the curves of Figure 3.2 and add the new
decentralized equilibrium condition taking the optimal taxation into consideration.
The same approach applies to traffic separation. From the first order condition
(3.7), the optimal traffic separation is decreasing in z, the share of car users. In the
presence of a large share of car users, the marginal impact of α is to dramatically
increase the transportation time for the majority of commuters and to decrease it
for a minority. Hence, in the global welfare maximum, the traffic separation is very
high, but this is not necessarily the case in the local maximum, and setting the level
of traffic separation of the global optimum is not a sufficient condition to reach this
equilibrium. This can lead to too much traffic separation in an equilibrium where
most of the commuters use their car.
3.3.3 Efficiency of policy tools
Even setting the optimal policy is not a sufficient condition to reach the first best.
This is why it is necessary to provide a more general tool to assess policies: effi-
ciency. In this section, we first define the conditions for either taxes or traffic sepa-
ration to be Pareto-improving. Second, given those conditions, we provide a general
result to compare their relative efficiency. If one is not strictly better than the other,
then taxation should be preferred for smaller changes of commuting patterns, while
traffic separation should be preferred for bigger changes.
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Figure 3.4: Effect of a taxation computed at z∗3 on the different decentralized
equilibria.
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a. Absolute efficiency of policy tools
Definition 9 For a given Nash equilibrium, zk, we define the initial swing com-
muter as the commuter indifferent between using a car or public transportation
before the introduction of a policy, and the final swing commuter as the commuter
indifferent between using a car or public transportation after the introduction of a
policy.
Definition 10 zT and zα are the equilibria after the implementation of, respectively,
a policy of taxation and of traffic separation.
In our setting, the study of policy implementation requires an analysis of its
effect on three types of agents. The initial users of public transportation (those on
the right of the initial swing commuter), the switching users (those located between
the initial and the final swing commuters), and the remaining car users (those on
the left of the final swing commuter).
We know, by definition of our externalities, that all the initial users of public
transportation are better off with the implementation of either policy. Indeed, they
enjoy higher network externalities (more users of public transportation), face less
congestion (less cars) and, in case of a taxation policy, receive a lump sum transfer.
In the case of traffic separation, they enjoy an additional decrease in congestion
(since public transportation benefits from a higher share of roads).
Now we study the effect of the policies on the switching users and the remain-
ing car users. We show that measuring the welfare of the remaining car users is
sufficient to assess the Pareto efficiency of these policies. First, we identify the con-
ditions under which the implementation of a policy can be Pareto improving and,
second, we compare the effect of those policies on remaining car users.
Lemma 16 Conditions for the two considered policies to be Pareto improving:
(i) A policy of taxation is Pareto improving if and only if
[
tc (α,zk)− tc
(
α,zT
)]
>
(
1− zT)T . (3.10)
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(ii) A policy of traffic separation is Pareto improving if and only if
tc(α,zk)> tc(α ′,zα). (3.11)
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.3.
A policy of taxation is Pareto improving if the reduction of congestion com-
pensates for the cost of taxation. A policy of traffic separation is Pareto improving
if it reduces congestion for the remaining car users. This implies a trade-off be-
tween fewer car users (zα < zk), concentrated over fewer traffic lanes (α ′ > α). The
combination of these two effects must reduce congestion for the policy of traffic
separation to be Pareto improving.
From equation (3.10), if z is sufficiently large, the condition is not extremely
restrictive. Indeed, the tax levied on car users is largely compensated by the pay-
offs resulting from the lump-sum benefit of the considered tax. However, when z
decreases, the tax base shrinks, making this condition more and more restrictive.
One can conveniently rewrite equation (3.11) by separating two effects: a posi-
tive effect (decrease in congestion due to the lower number of cars) and a negative
effect (increase in congestion due to the increase of traffic separation):
tc(α,z)− tc(α ′,zα) = [tc(α,z)− tc(α,zα)]− [tc(α ′,zα)− tc(α,zα)]. (3.12)
The likelihood for a traffic separation policy to be Pareto improving depends on the
relative importance of these two forces.
b. Relative efficiency of policy tools
It is not possible to compare the absolute efficiency of these two policies without
considering specific functional forms for congestion. Nevertheless, a general intu-
ition of the relative efficiency of these two policies can be derived from the following
proposition.
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Proposition 11 Assume there exist two distinct policies, α1 and T1, that yield the
same equilibrium, z1, and that car users enjoy the same utility under either of these
two policies. Then, for any other two distinct policies, α2 and T2, yielding another
equilibrium, z2 (z2 < z1), car users always prefer the policy of traffic separation to
the policy of taxation.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.4.
It follows from this proposition that even though we cannot theoretically exclude
the possibility that one of the two policies is always better than the other, if this is
not the case, taxation should be preferred for small changes in z, while separation
should be preferred for larger changes.
This relates to the two schools of thought we presented in the literature review.
If a social planner is convinced that the city is car-dependent, and that any policy
can only have a marginal impact on the modal split, then a policy of taxation may be
the best policy. But, if one believes that a large shift can take place, traffic separation
might be a better choice.
3.4 Extensions
3.4.1 Capacity constraints and discomfort externalities
There are two possible types of congestion in public transportation. First, public
transportation is a source of congestion. For instance, there may be so many buses
on a bus lane that the travel time on that lane increases with the number of public
transportation users. Second, congestion can occur when commuters cannot enter
in the first bus and face a queue to access public transportation. This would increase
the waiting time for commuters.
Remember that an equilibrium is such that εi = ∆(α,z)−W (z)+ fc. Conges-
tion between public transportation leads ∆(α,z) to decrease after some threshold,
say, z. Congestion within public transportation implies that instead of enjoying net-
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work externalities among the users of public transportation, W (z) decreases below
a certain threshold.
Capacity constraints, viewed in a strict way, would be that there is no mean
to serve the demand for public transportation if this demand is higher than a given
threshold, say (1− z). In this case, for people exceeding this threshold, waiting time
goes to infinity. In Figure 3.5, we illustrate the case of a strict capacity constraint,
i.e. no possibility to transport more than a share (1− z) of the population by public
transportation. Note that any line located between the dashed line (no congestion
within or between public transportation) and the vertical line could be achieved in
the presence of different degrees of capacity constraints and/or congestion in public
transportation.
Another representation of congestion within the public transportation system
is to explicitly model discomfort externalities. Crowding costs (Kraus, 1991) are
imposed by every marginal passenger on other passengers while the Mohring effect
could be seen as a discrete process. Consider a bus lane where a bus is added when a
given number of passengers per bus is reached. Every time a bus is added, the qual-
ity of public transportation “jumps” by discretely reducing travel time. However,
within any bus, there is marginal congestion. The discomfort externality locally
reduces the incentive to use public transportation when the number of passengers
per bus increases. Assuming the network effect outweighs the congestion effect,
the cost function is modified as in Figure 3.6. W(z) is locally decreasing in z and
stepwise increasing in z. With this modified setup, the likelihood of facing multiple
equilibria increases. The incentive to remain locally with an equilibrium share of
car users is increased by the fact that, at the margin, increasing the share of public
transportation users decreases the average quality of public transportation.
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Figure 3.5: Strict capacity constraint in public transportation
Figure 3.6: Discomfort externalities in public transportation
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3.4.2 Building an underground
For the moment, we have considered traffic separation corresponding to bus lanes
or light rail: more space for public transportation and less space for cars. Another
way to prevent public transportation from congestion is to build an underground. In
comparison to delimiting bus lanes (which is almost free), an underground is much
more costly to build. Hence, even if one cannot deny that an underground can be an
efficient way to provide fast public transportation and decrease congestion within
public transport, it is likely to be counter-productive when dealing with coordina-
tion problems. Indeed, the underground may actually decrease the travel time both
for public transportation and for cars. If, as in Tabuchi (1993), the cost of infrastruc-
ture is supported only by public transportation users, building an underground may
actually decrease the share of public transportation users in the modal shift.
Assume that the underground is the only available type of public transportation.
α˜ is now the investment in the underground. This investment is associated with
M(α˜), the lump sum cost paid by all commuters, independent of their modal choice.
The effect of α˜ on time spent commuting by car is now ∂ t
c(α˜,z)
∂ α˜ ≤ 0, because
the underground does not reduce (and potentially increases) the space for cars in the
city. The marginal impact of α˜ on t pt(α˜,z) remains negative: more investments in
public transportation reduce the commuting time when using public transportation.
Defining ∆u (α˜,z) = tc(α˜,z)− t pt(α˜,z), the utilities of both type of commuters
become
Uci (α,z) = − fc− tc(α˜,z)−M(α˜)+
εi
2
,
U pti (α,z) = −W (z)− t pt(α˜,z)−M(α˜)−
εi
2
,
and the new equilibrium is defined by
εi = fc−W (z)+∆u(α˜,z).
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Since ∀α = α˜, (α and α˜ ∈ [0,1]) , we have ∆u(α˜,z) ≤ ∆1(α˜,z), the equilibrium
comes with a lower share of public transportation users and, in the case of multiple
equilibria, it is even more difficult to avoid the ‘bad’ equilibrium. This result would
be even stronger if the cost of the underground were supported by public trans-
portation users only, as in Tabuchi (1993). However, an argument in favor of the
existence of an underground could be linked to congestion in public transportation
(as discussed in the previous extension). In that case, an underground can be seen
as a means to expand the supply of public transportation in the presence of capcity
constraints.
3.5 Conclusion
We show that the combination of externalities of congestion, cross modal external-
ities and network externalities with heterogeneous commuters can lead to multiple
equilibria. This may explain why a priori similar cities end up with very different
patterns of car use. We also show that policy tools, namely taxation and traffic sep-
aration, are not equivalent in terms of welfare. When one of the two is not strictly
more efficient than the other, separation should be preferred for large-scale policies
while taxation should be preferred for smaller modifications of commuting patterns.
This result partly explains the differences in policy recommendations from the two
schools in the literature - physical planning and car-dependant cities - suggesting
different reforms to improve the modal choice within a city. On the one hand, a
policymaker that believes (as “physical planners”) that there must be an important
change in the modal split should focus on the allocation of space (α in our model)
and increase the share of roads devoted to public transportation only. On the other
hand, a social planner only concerned with marginal changes in the cost of cars - or
that simply believes that car dependence is the best possible state of the world for a
given city - should privilege taxation.
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3.6 Technical Appendixes
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. We know from proposition (1) that an equilibrium is a solution to
G(zk) = fc−W (zk)+∆(α,zk).
First, we show that the existence of a Nash equilibrium, zk, satisfying
∂G(zk)
∂ z
>
∂ fc−W (zk)+∆(α,zk)
∂ z
, (3.13)
is a sufficient condition for the existence of multiple equilibria. Second, we show
that this is a necessary condition.
(i) If there exist such a zk, then for any η > 0 arbitrarily small, we have
G(zk) = fc−W (zk)+∆(α,zk)
G(zk +η) > fc−W (zk +η)+∆(α,zk +η)
G(zk−η) < fc−W (zk−η)+∆(α,zk−η).
Since the support of F is (−∞,∞) and therefore G(1) < fc−W (1)+∆(α,1) and
G(0)> fc−W (0)+∆(α,0). It implies that the functions must cross at least three
time and there exists at least three equilibria. So, condition (3.13) is a sufficient
condition for the existence of multiple equilibria.
(ii) Assume that at any Nash Equilibrium zk, we have
∂G(zk)
∂ z
<
∂ fc−W (zk)+∆(α,zk)
∂ z
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then for any η > 0, we have
G(zk) = fc−W (zk)+∆(α,zk)
G(zk +η) < fc−W (zk +η)+∆(α,zk +η)
G(zk−η) > fc−W (zk−η)+∆(α,zk−η).
Since the support of F is (−∞,∞), for any z′,z′′ : z′ < zk < z′′, G(z′)> fc−W (z′)+
∆(α,z′) and G(z′′) < fc−W (z′′)+∆(α,z′′). This implies that the functions cross
only once and condition (3.13) is necessary.
From (i) and (ii), condition (3.13) is, indeed, a necessary and sufficient condition.
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Assume there exist T equilibria z1 < z2 < ... < zT
(1) We want to show that z1 Pareto dominates any equilibrium z j, j = {2, ...,T}
(2) For any pair z j, z1 with z j > z1, there are three categories of commuters:
(a) Commuters with εi such that F(ε)< 1− z j. Their best response is to use public
transportation in both equilibria. Those users are better off in equilibrium z1 as
t pt(α,z1)< t pt(α,z j) and W (z1)<W (z j),
then
t pt(α,z1)+W (z1)+
εi
2
< t pt(α,z j)+W (z j)+
εi
2
(b) Commuters with εi such that 1−z j <F(ε)< 1−z1. Their best response is public
transportation in equilibrium z1 and car in equilibrium z j. Those users are better off
in equilibrium z1. Indeed, as commuters reveal their preferences by choosing their
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mode, then for any F(ε j)ε[1− z j,1− z1]:
W (z j)+ t pt(α,z j)+ ε j > fc+ tc(α,z j) (3.14)
and
W (z1)+ t pt(α,z1)+ ε j < fc+ tc(α,z1). (3.15)
As congestion increases in z,
fc+ tc(α,z j)> fc+ tc(α,z1).
Hence, it is straightforward that
fc+ tc(α,z j)>W (z1)+ t pt(α,z1)+ ε j
(c) Commuters with εi such that 1−z1 <F(ε). Their best response in both equilibria
is to take the car. Those users are better off in equilibrium z1 as:
fc+ tc(α,z j)> fc+ tc(α,z1).
3.6.3 Proof of Lemma 16
Proof. Let us divide the population into three families: those who use public trans-
portation before and after the implementation of the new policy (PT-PT), those who
use their car before and after the policy (C-C), and the swing commuters, those
who used their car before the policy and public transportation afterward (C-PT). We
show the effect of both policies on the differents families described above.
In the case of taxation:
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1) PT-PT: the variation of their welfare is given by
U ptT −U pt =W (zk)−W
(
zT
)
+ tPT (α,zk)− tPT
(
α,zT
)
+ zT T
which can be decomposed into three effects, all welfare enhancing (as long as zT <
zk): W (zk)−W
(
zT
)
corresponds to the reduction of waiting time; tPT (α,zk)−
tPT
(
α,zT
)
comes from the reduction of congestion; and zT T comes from the lump
sum transfer from car users to the user of public transportation.
2) C-C: the policy of taxation increases their welfare if
UcT −Uc = tc (α,zk)− tc
(
α,zT
)− (1− zT)T > 0
i.e. it increases their welfare if
tc (α,zk)− tc
(
α,zT
)
>
(
1− zT)T
3) C-PT: It is easy to show that if car users are better off, swing commuters are also
better off. Swing commuters prefer public transportation to the car under the policy
leading to zT . Hence, if their utility when using a car is higher then in zk, so is their
utility while using public transportation.
In the case of separation, increasing α to α ′:
1) PT-PT: the variation of their welfare is given by
U ptα −U pt =W (zk)−W (zα)+ tPT (α,zk)− tPT
(
α ′,zα
)
which can be decomposed into two effects, both being welfare enhancing (as long as
zα < zk): W (zk)−W (zα) corresponds to the reduction of waiting time a,d tPT (α,zk)−
tPT (α ′,zα) comes from the reduction of congestion due to two forces: (i) less car
and (ii) more traffic lines devoted to PT only.
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2) C-C: the policy of separation increases their welfare if
Ucα −Uc = tc (α,zk)− tc
(
α ′,zα
)
> 0
i.e. it increases their welfare if
tc (α,zk)> tc
(
α ′,zα
)
3) C-PT: The reasoning is similar as for the taxation policy. If car users are better
off, swing commuters are also better off.
3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Starting from α0≥ 0 and T0 = 0 and given the definition and the properties of
β (α,z) (note that β (α,z) =− tPT ′α (α∗,z)tc′α (α∗,z) with β
′
α (α,z)≥ 0 ∀z ∈ [0,1]), it is possible
to define γ (α) such that
t pt (α1,z1)− t pt (α0,z1) =−γ (α1) [tc (α1,z1)− tc (α0,z1)] , (3.16)
with γ ′ (α)> 0.
(i) Consider two policies: α1 (α1 > α0 is associated with T = 0) and T1 (as-
sociated with α0) yielding the same equilibrium z1. By definition, a commuter
indifferent between the two policies has an ε j such that
fc+T1−W (z1)+∆(α0,z1) = ε j = fc−W (z1)+∆(α1,z1) .
This simplifies to
T1 = ∆(α1,z1)−∆(α0,z1) ,
Technical Appendixes 116
which can be conveniently rewritten as
T1 = [tc (α1,z1)− tcα0,z1]−
[
t pt (α1,z1)− t pt (α0,z1)
]
.
By assumption, this leads to
T1 = (1+ γ (α1)) [tc (α1,z1)− tc (α0,z1)] . (3.17)
(ii) Car users are indifferent between these two policies if ∃ α1, T1, z1 such that
(1− z1)T1 = tc (α1,z1)− tc (α0,z1) .
These conditions imply
(1− z1) [1+ γ (α1)] [tc (α1,z1)− tc (α0,z1)] = tc (α1,z1)− tc (α0,z1)
(1− z1) = 11+ γ (α1) .
Now consider two alternative policies associated with a higher use of public trans-
portation: α2,T2,z2 with z2 < z1. Car users are now better off with traffic separation
than with taxation iff
(1− z2)T2 > tc (α2,z2)− tc (α0,z2) .
From the expression of T in equation (3.17),
(1− z2) [1+ γ (α2)] [tc (α2,z2)− tc (α0,z2)] > tc (α2,z2)− tc (α0,z2)
(1− z2) > 11+ γ (α2) .
This is always true as z2 < z1, γ (α2)≥ γ (α1) and given that (1− z1) = 11+γ(α1)
